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In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,' the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the rule that only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing
to sue under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act ('34 Act)
2 and
SEC Rule 10b-5.3 The Supreme Court held in Blue Chip that an individual
who was fraudulently induced not to purchase stock could not bring an
action under Rule 10b-5.1 Despite the Blue Chip implication that only
actual purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to sue under Rule
10b-5, lower federal courts generally have applied the purchaser-seller re-
quirement liberally to grant standing to defrauded plaintiffs.5 In recent
decisions, lower federal courts have both expanded and contracted Rule
10b-5 availability to defrauded investors. Courts have applied the Blue
1 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or-sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
421 U.S. at 754-55. Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstan-
ces under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
1 421 U.S. at 754-55. See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under
the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977); Gallagher, 10b-
5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?, 80 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Gallagher]; 1976-1977 Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 34
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 882 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1976-1977 Developments].
' See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 1289
(1979) (capital call pursuant to limited partnership agreement constitutes purchase or sale
of a security); Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Bankers Trust
Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1977) (collateral pledge of securities is a purchase or sale);
McCloskey v. McCloskey, 450 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (granting right of first refusal to
issuing corporation is a purchase or sale). But see Sacks v. Reynolds Sec. Inc., [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,715 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 19, 1978) (failure to transfer securities
account not a purchase or sale); National Bank of Commerce v. All American Assurance
Corp., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978) (collateral pledge of securities not a purchase or sale).
1979]
902 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Chip mandate during the past year in considering whether limited partner-
ship agreements,' voting trust agreements, 7 corporate reorganizations," and
pledges of stock9 constitute a purchase or sale of a security.
Investment Decision Under Partnership Agreements
The Supreme Court in Blue Chip stated that a contractual agreement
to purchase or sell a security constitutes a purchase or sale within the
meaning of section 10(b) of the '34 Act.'0 In Goodman v. Epstein," the
Seventh Circuit was presented with the issue of whether a purchase of an
interest in a limited -partnership' 2 occurs only at the time the defrauded
plaintiff becomes contractually committed to make subsequent cash con-
tributions to the partnership or whether a purchase occurs each time a
subsequent contribution to the partnership is made. The court rejected the
argument that the only purchase occurs at the time of the original commit-
ment to invest, instead holding that each subsequent capital contribution
constitutes a separate purchase and sale.' 3 The court reasoned that because
an investment decision remained to be made at the time of each capital
call, the response to the call constituted a purchase of a security.'4 Thus,
material misrepresentations or omissions made at the time of the call were
"in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security.' 5
In Goodman, the plaintiffs were limited partners in the D-E Westmont
Limited Partnership, a real estate development venture.'6 The partnership
agreement obligated the limited partners to furnish total capital of three
million dollars in response to calls for capital which were made from time
to time by the general partners.'7 During the course of negotiations for the
sale of the development venture, the general partners encountered sub-
stantial financial difficulties.'8 Despite these difficulties, the general part-
' Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 414 (7th Cir. 1978); see text accompanying notes
11-23 infra.
McCloskey v. McCloskey, 450 F. Supp. 991, 994-95 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see text accompa-
nying notes 66-80 infra.
I Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Brooks, 462 F. Supp. 190, 195-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see text
accompanying notes 48-58 infra.
I National Bank of Commerce v. All American Assurance Corp., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298-
1300 (5th Cir. 1978); see text accompanying notes 31-39 infra.
0 421 U.S. 750-51; see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1976).
582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1289 (1979).
'2 A limited partnership is a "security" within the meaning of section 2(1) of the '33 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976). See Hirsh v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo.
L. REv. 581 (1972).
,3 582 F.2d at 410-14.
" Id. at 413.
15 Id. at 414; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) only reaches fraud which occurs
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." See note 2supra; note 76 infra.
,S 582 F.2d at 391-92.
,7 Id. at 391 n.9.
' Id. at 392-94. After signing the partnership agreement, the general partners initiated
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ners continued to request capital from the limited partners without disclos-
ing the financial decline of the Westmont project."9 The plaintiffs sued the
general partners under Rule 10b-5, alleging that the general partners mis-
represented the financial status of the partnership when calling for addi-
tional funds."0
The limited partners asserted that failure to disclose the declining pros-
pects of the Westmont project when calling for additional capital consti-
tuted a violation of Rule 10b-5. 21 The defendants argued that their failure
to disclose material information to the limited partners did not violate
Rule 10b-5 because the limited partners were contractually obligated to
respond to calls by the partnership agreement." The court, disagreeing
negotiations with Larwin Corporation, a real estate developer, for the sale of the Westmont
project. Id. at 392. Problems arose, however, when the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency and local authorities refused to issue sewer permits to the Westmont partners. Id. at
392-93. In addition, the development itself ran into long and costly delays. Id. at 393.
11 Id. After requesting return of funds invested to secure a building permit, the general
partners made a $500,000 capital call. On the advice of counsel, the general partners did not
state the purpose of the call. Id. at 394. One final call was made by the general partners. Id.
1 Id. at 390.
21 Id. at 398. In arguing that the defendants' fraud occurred in connection with the
purchase of a security, the plaintiffs urged that the original commitment to the partnership
was not the final investment decision to be made. They asserted that even after signing the
partnership agreement, several options remained open to them upon receiving a call for a
capital contribution. Id. Among these were: abandoning the project, filing for a declaratory
judgment ending the partnership, and, in the case of fraud on the part of the general partners,
refusing to comply with the call. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the presence of these
options at the time of receipt of a call for a capital contribution rendered the decision to invest
more capital an "investment decision" and made receipt of accurate information from the
general partners vital in reaching an informed decision. Id.
12 Id. at 401. The defendants relied on Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1972), to support their assertion that a purchase or sale of a security occurs only
when the buyer originally commits himself to purchase that security. 582 F.2d at 401. In
Radiation Dynamics, the respondent corporation sold stock of TRG, Inc. to the defendant.
464 F.2d at 879. Subsequent to this sale, TRG merged with another corporation, and the value
of TRG stock increased greatly. Id. Radiation Dynamics brought suit, alleging that defen-
dant's failure to disclose the existence of the impending merger violated Rule 10b-5. Id. The
Radiation Dynamics court, in affirming trial court verdicts in favor of the defendant, stated
that Radiation Dynamics was contractually committed to sell the securities before the merger
became formalized. 464 F.2d at 888. Therefore, the court held that any material misstate-
ments or omissions occurring after that commitment date were not in connection with the
purchase or sale. Id. Applying this standard, the Goodman defendants asserted that since the
allegedly fraudulent acts occurred after the limited partners were committed to enter the
partnership, no misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security occurred. 582 F.2d at 401; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978);
notes 2-3 supra.
The Goodman court stated that at the time Radiation Dynamics became contractually
committed to sell the TRG stock, the merger was still in doubt, and therefore the information
was not material and could not be relied upon in making an investment decision. Id. at 412.
The Goodman court then stated that Radiation Dynamics should not be read to apply to an
ongoing relationship, but only to a "one-shot deal." Id. at 412-13. Instead, the court stated,
both the general and limited partners in the case at hand contemplated an ongoing relation-
1979]
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with the defendants' assertion, stated that the fact that the plaintiffs were
empowered to dissolve the partnership, should its operation prove unprof-
itable, militated against the conclusion that the limited partners had irrev-
ocably committed themselves to the partnership.2
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Goodman comports with other deci-
sions focusing on the economic reality of the transaction instead of relying
on strict contractual theories.24 Had the Goodman plaintiffs known of the
partnership's reversals, they would not have responded to the calls. They
would have ended the partnership and sought recovery of their invested
funds. Because the plaintiffs retained these options, the Goodman court
correctly realized that the plaintiffs were actual purchasers within the
meaning of Rule 10b-5 when they supplied funds pursuant to the capital
calls.2
Pledgor-Pledgee
Courts have had difficulty applying the Blue Chip purchaser-seller
requirement to pledges of stock. The question whether a pledge of stock is
a transaction within the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is an impor-
tant one because the purview of those laws would be greatly broadened if
stock-pledge fraud is actionable under federal law. The Second and Fifth
Circuits have split on this issue. 2 The Second Circuit, in Mallis v. FDIC,
7
ship, and therefore the limited partners were left with "the possibility of an investment
decision each time a call was made." Id. at 413.
2 582 F.2d at 410-13; see note 20 supra.
24 See, e.g., Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1977) (pledge of securities is a
purchase or sale because risk undertaken by pledgee is no different than risk undertaken by
ordinary investor); McCloskey v. McCloskey, 450 F. Supp. 991, 994-95 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (court
must look to economic reality of transaction to determine whether purchase or sale has
occurred).
1 582 F.2d at 410-13. In support of its decision that a purchase of a security occurred
each time a capital contribution was made, the Goodman court relied on the Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of the "in connection with" requirement in Superintendent of Ins. v.
Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), and several lower court decisions broadly constru-
ing the terms "in connection with." 582 F.2d at 410 n.64; see Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,
380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Devine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). The Goodman
court, however, made no attempt to square its decision with the Blue Chip decision. Other
courts, like Goodman, have realized that Blue Chip is of little aid in analyzing whether a
purchase or sale has occurred in certain transactions. See, e.g., McCloskey v. McCloskey, 450
F. Supp. 991, 994-95 (E.D. Pa. 1970); text accompanying notes 66-80 infra. Although Blue
Chip stated that a purchase or sale must have occurred in order for a plaintiff to have
standing to sue under section 10(b), the decision gave little guidance in determining whether
a purchase or sale actually occurred.
26 Compare Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977) with National Bank v. All
American Assurance Corp., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978) and Reid v. Hughes, 578 F.2d 634
(5th Cir. 1978).




held that a pledge of stock is a purchase or sale under Rule 10b-5.28 The
basis for this holding was the court's opinion that a pledge transaction
involves an investment risk for the pledgee which is indistinguishable from
the risk undertaken by an ordinary investor.29
In the past year, the Fifth Circuit has twice rejected the argument that
a pledge of stock is a purchase or sale of a security." In National Bank of
Commerce v. All American Assurance Corp.,3 the court expressly declined
to follow Mallis and held that a pledgee-bank did not have standing to sue
under Rule 10b-5.32 In All American, the pledgee-bank received worthless
stock as pledge for a commercial loan.? After default the bank brought
suit, alleging violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33
Act) and section 10(b) of the '34 Act.? The district court dismissed the
Id. at 829-30; see generally '1976-1977 Developments, supra note 4, at 886-87.
2 568*F.2d at 829. The Mallis court refused to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding in
McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
568 F.2d at 829. In McClure, the Fifth Circuit stated that a pledgee might have standing to
sue under § 10(b) after the pledgor defaulted on his obligation, but the pledge alone does not
necessarily constitute a purchase or sale of a security. 497 F.2d at 495-96; cf. Bosse v. Crowell
Collier & MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602, 611 (9th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff whose pledged stock was
foreclosed upon by pledgee has standing to sue under §10(b) if pledge was induced by material
misstatements or omissions). The Mallis court instead relied on United States v. Gentile, 530
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976), where the Second Circuit held that a
pledge of stock was a purchase or sale for the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act's
criminal enforcement provision, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1976). 568 F.2d at 829; see 530 F.2d at
566-67; 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 4, at 886-87. The Mallis court, in determining
that a pledge of stock satisfies the Blue Chip purchaser-seller requirement, stated that a
pledge of stock is no different and no less concrete than a normal transfer of title. 568 F.2d
at 829. The court stated that the risks undertaken by a pledgee, including the possibility that
the pledged securities have no value, entitled the pledgee to the protection of the federal
securities laws. Id.
11 See National Bank of Commerce v. All American Assurance Corp., 583 F.2d 1295,
1298-1300 (5th Cir. 1978); Reid v. Hughes, 578 F.2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1978).
31 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978).
2 Id. at 1298-1300.
3 Id. at 1297. The defendant wished to purchase a Texas insurance firm. In order to make
the purchase, All American devised a stock pledge in which National Bank transferred $2.5
million to the insurance firm in consideration for the purchase price of the pledged stock. Id.
at 1296-97. The pledged stock, however, had not been authorized by the insurance firm's
Board of Directors, and was therefore worthless. Id. The Texas Insurance Board, unaware of
the fraud, approved the sale of the insurance firm to All American. Id.
11 Id. Section 17(a) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
1979]
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bank's claim on the grounds that a commercial loan secured by a pledge
of securities is not a protected transaction under Rule 10b-5.3 1 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating that the difference between the risk
undertaken by a pledgee and the risk undertaken by an ordinary investor
was clear. The pledgee, stated the court, does not benefit from any appre-
ciation in value of the stock, has none of the rights usually held by share-
holders, and has no right to sell the stock for its own account.31 In addition,
the pledgee has no general property right in the collateral, but only a right
to sell in satisfaction of the pledgor's obligation should default occur.37 The
All American court also noted that the pledgee, unlike an ordinary inves-
tor, has a remedy against the pledgor on the note.38 Thus, if Congiess had
desired to protect collateral pledges against fraud, it could have done so
expressly.39 Absent such congressional coverage, the All American court
declined to extend section 10(b) protection to pledge transactions.
The differences between the Second and Fifth Circuit's analysis of a
pledge transaction centers on each court's perception of the scope of the
federal securities laws. The Mallis court recognized that if pledgees have
standing as purchasers the number of section 10(b) plaintiffs would in-
crease. The court nonetheless construed section 10(b) expansively and con-
cluded that such a result would not undermine the policy objectives of
section 10(b) and Blue Chip."5 The All American court, using a more re-
strictive construction of section 10(b) and Blue Chip, refused to grant
standing to a defrauded pledgee without express statutory authorization."
Although the language of Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a) of the '33 Act are virtually identical,
only purchasers of securities have standing to sue under section 17(a).
583 F.2d at 1302. Although the district court opinion was unreported, the court dis-
missing National Bank's claim was undoubtedly influenced by both McClure v. First Na-
tional Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974) and Reid v. Hughes, 578 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1978).
See note 28 supra. In Reid, the Fifth Circuit, relying on McClure, held that a mere pledge of
securities cannot constitute a purchase or sale within the meaning of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. 578 F.2d at 638. The Fifth Circuit in All American, however, did not rely heavily on Reid,
stating that the Reid court failed to develop the pledge question. 583 F.2d at 1298.
Id. at 1300.
Id. (citing Pauly v. State Loan & Trust Co., 165 U.S. 606, 622 (1897)).
Id. at 1300.
39 Id. In addition to the argument that courts should not legislate, the All American
court, quoting Professor Loss, stated that federal legislation was not needed to protect pledge
transactions. Id. (citing 1 L. Loss, SECURrrEs REGULATION 649 (2d ed. 1961)) [hereinafter
cited as 1 L. Loss]. Neither Professor Loss nor the All American court, however, state the
reasoning behind the conclusion that a pledge transaction does not need the protection of the
federal securities laws. See 583 F.2d at 1300; 1 L. Loss, supra, at 649.
10 568 F.2d at 829; see 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 4, at 886-87; note 29 supra.
" 583 F.2d at 1300. The All American court stated that although Mallis held that the
federal securities laws ought to encompass pledge transactions, Mallis did little to support
the conclusion that those laws do in fact cover pledge transactions. The All American court
implied that Mallis should not have held that section 10(b) covers pledge transactions with-
out a clear expression of such an intent from Congress. See id.; note 39 supra. The All
American court distinguished several cases on the ground that, in those cases, a purchase or
sale occurred because the secured party foreclosed on the stock in question. 583 F.2d at 1299;
[Vol. XXXVI
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"Change. in the Nature of the Investment" Test: The Forced
Seller Exception
Prior to Blue Chip, several circuit courts had adopted the "forced
seller" doctrine to avoid an overly strict application of the purchaser-seller
requirement.2 This doctrine, a judicially-created exception to the
purchaser-seller requirement,"3 has survived the Blue Chip decision in at
least two circuits.4' The forced seller doctrine holds that an involuntary
and fundamental change in the nature of a plaintiffs investment will be
treated as a purchase or sale of securities for the purposes of standing under
Rule 10b-5.15 Under the forced seller doctrine, no actual purchase or sale
of a security is necessary to confer section 10(b) standing. A recent deci-
sion has reexamined the degree of change in the nature of the investment
required to apply the forced seller doctrine .
4
In Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Brooks, 4 the district court for the Southern
District of New York considered whether a corporation, whose controlling
interest in two other corporations was eliminated by a stock exchange
between the two latter corporations, was a forced seller and therefore had
standing to sue under Rule 10b-5. The. court refused to characterize the
plaintiff corporation as a forced seller and dismissed the section 10(b)
claim.49
see SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960); SEC v.
Pig'n Whistle Corp., 359 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Ill. 1973); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins.
Co., 334 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 477 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1973). These three cases
held that a bank, as a pledgee, becomes an underwriter for the purposes of section 4(1)'of
the '33 Act when it forecloses and sells pledged unregistered stock. The All American court
stated that foreclosure and sale in the circumstances of those cases placed the stock in the
"public arena protected by the Securities Acts." 583 F.2d at 1299. Although the cases are
distinguishable, the All American court did not state the ramifications of possible foreclosure
by a bank such as the plaintiff in All American. Such a foreclosure should have no effect on
the purchaser-seller question because, as the All American court recognized, foreclosure upon
worthless stock would be fruitless. See id. at 1297.
42 See Gallagher, supra note 4, at 8-12. The term "forced seller" refers to a plaintiff who
has neither purchased nor sold securities, but who nevertheless has standing to sue under §
10(b) because the defendant's fraudulent conduct will force him to sell at some later time.
Id. at 8-9 n.39. Requiring the plaintiff to postpone his suit until he actually exchanges his
stock for cash is "a needless formality." Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
13 See Gallagher, supra note 4, at 8-10.
" See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2253
(1978); Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C. 1977). Commentators
are divided on the issue whether the forced seller exception should survive Blue Chip.
Compare Gallagher, supra note 4, at 8-12 with Note, Standing Under Rule 10b-5 After Blue
Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REv. 413, 431-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Standing Under Rule
10b-5].
'5 See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977).
" See note 42 supra.
17 See Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Brooks, 462 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"462 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" Id. at 197.
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Canadian Javelin held a controlling interest of stock in two other Cana-
dian corporations, Bison and Jubilee 0 In order to eliminate Canadian
Javelin's control over their respective corporations, Bison and Jubilee
agreed to an exchange of stock between the two corporations.-' As a result
of this freeze-out, Canadian Javelin's interest in both Bison and Jubilee
was substantially reduced.12 Canadian Javelin argued that the freeze-out
was fraudulent and therefore violated Rule 10b-5.13 The plaintiff asserted
standing as a forced seller of securities. 54 In dismissing the complaint, the
court held that the freeze-out of Canadian Javelin did not significantly
change the nature of its investment, but merely reduced it.5 The court
held that, in order to establish standing as a forced seller, the plaintiff
must show that the change in the nature of his investment was significant
enough to qualify the investment as a new security. 6 The plaintiff failed
to meet this test because its investment had not been completely elimi-
nated.57 In so holding, the Canadian Javelin court strongly implied that
only a "cashed-out" stockholder could satisfy the "significant investment
change" test. 8
In another case examining a change in the nature of an investment, the
federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that an
exchange of stock for voting trust certificates is not a purchase or sale
10 Id. at 192.
SI Id.
52 Id. at 192 n.1. In the stock exchange, Bison gave Jubilee 3.3 million shares of Bison
stock in exchange for 2.1 million shares of Jubilee stock. Id. As a result of this exchange,
Javelin's control interest in Bison was reduced to 34.5 percent, and Javelin's control interest
in Jubilee was reduced to 23.9 percent. Id. Through the exchange, the defendants obtained a
control interest in each corporation. Id.
s Id. at 192. Canadian Javelin did not state why the exchange was fraudulent.
5' Id. at 195. Canadian Javelin asserted that the forced seller doctrine had survived Blue
Chip, and that the proper test to determine whether a plaintiff is a forced seller is whether
his interest has been converted from one in a going enterprise into a right solely to a payment
of money for his shares. Id.; see Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1330, 1337
(D.D.C. 1977).
5 462 F. Supp. at 196; see note 52 supra.
5' 462 F. Supp. at 196.
57 Id. Houlihan, as the Canadian Javelin court recognized, clearly requires that the
plaintiff have only a right to a payment of cash for his frozen-out stock. See Houlihan v.
Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (D.D.C. 1977); note 54 supra.
58 See 463 F. Supp. at 195-97; Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977)
(change in nature of investment must be so significant as to qualify as a new investment);
Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (D.D.C. 1977); 1976-1977
Developments, supra note 4, at 894. After determining that Javelin could not assert standing
as a forced seller, the Canadian Javelin court stated that there was serious doubt that, even
if Javelin could be granted standing under the forced seller doctrine a § 10(b) cause of action
existed. 462 F. Supp. at 196. Relying on Piper v. Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. 1 (1977) and Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Javelin court stated that once full and fair
disclosure has taken place in a transaction, the fairness of the transaction is, at most, a
tangential concern under § 10(b). Id. (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
478 (1977)). Characterizing Javelins' allegations as claims of a breach of fiduciary duties, the
Javelin court stated that such a claim belonged in the Canadian courts. Id. at 197.
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under section 10(b). In McCloskey v. McCloskey,59 the shareholders of a
corporation exchanged all their stock for voting trust certificates reflecting
the number of shares held in trust." Eight years later the voting trust
terminated and all stock was returned except stock held in trust for the
plaintiff and defendant." The reason for the retention of this stock was
that a second voting trust had been executed between plaintiff and defen-
dant." After the execution of the second voting trust, the defendant pro-
posed a stockholders' agreement in which the corporation would be granted
a right of first refusal on all currently outstanding and subsequently issued
stock.13 This agreement was adopted and the defendant voted and signed
on behalf of the plaintiff. 4 Upon discovering the right of first refusal agree-
ment, the plaintiff brought suit against the voting trustee, alleging that she
was induced to sign the voting trust agreement by material misrepresen-
tations and omissions made by the voting trustee."
The defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff
was neither a purchaser nor seller within the meaning of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.11 The McCloskey court agreed, stating that although
Birnbaum and Blue Chip firmly establish the purchaser-seller require-
ment, those cases did not purport to provide an exclusive definition of a
purchase or sale. 7 In order to determine whether the plaintiff became a
purchaser or seller by depositing her shares in the voting trust, the court
used the two-step analysis employed by courts before the Blue Chip deci-
sion.68 First, the court focused on the economic reality of the transaction
by comparing the rights the plaintiff kept with those she relinquished in
entering the voting trust agreement." The court reasoned that since the
plaintiff retained the right to dividends on her stock, the right to subscribe
to any class of stock issued to shareholders, and the right to receive a pro
rata distribution of corporate assets in the event of liquidiation, she re-
tained every right normally held by a stockholder save one-the right to
vote. The court then considered whether the changes in the plaintiff's
' 450 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1978).









" Id. at 995. In establishing the first part of the two part test, the court relied on United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). In Foreman, the Supreme Court
disregarded the fact that the plaintiffs held "shares" of a cooperative housing development
and held that, because their shares had none of the attributes of ordinary investment securi-
ties, the shares were not securities within the meaning of section 2(1) of the '33 Act. 421 U.S.
at 848-58; see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
11 450 F. Supp. at 995.
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investment were significant enough to qualify as a purchase or sale.' The
court stated that the voting trust agreement, instead of resembling a pur-
chase or sale, reflected an internal management decision to provide the
plaintiff with a continuing interest in a corporation run by the voting
trustee. 2 The court concluded that plaintiff's interest was not transformed
or terminated in any real sense, and that her situation was distinguishable
from true forced seller cases.
73
The McCloskey court decided, however, that the right of first refusal
granted by the trustee to the corporation did constitute a purchase or
sale." The court reasoned that the plaintiff, as beneficial owner of the
stock, had standing to sue under section 10(b).75 The defendant argued
that even if the granting of the right of first refusal constituted a purchase
or sale of a security, the plaintiff failed to establish the "in connection
with" requirement of a section 10(b) claim because the alleged fraud could
only have occurred at the time the voting trust was executed, a full four
months before the right of first refusal contract was entered into.16 The
McCloskey court rejected this argument, stating that plaintiff's allegation
of defendant's continuing scheme to drain the corporation's assets was
1, Id.; see Murphey v. Hillwood Villa Assoc., 411 F. Supp. 287, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (in
order to qualify as forced seller, plaintiff must prove significant change in nature of invest-
ment); text accompanying note 45 supra.
72 450 F. Supp. at 995.
11 Id. After determining that a purchase or sale had not occurred, the McCloskey court,
like the Canadian Javelin court, stated that the purposes of § 10(b) would not be served by
finding that McCloskey had standing since Congress, in creating section 10(b), did not intend
to "regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement. "
(emphasis in original) Id. (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12 (1971)); see note 58 supra. The McCloskey court implied that the plaintiff's claim should
be resolved under state law.
11 450 F. Supp. at 996; see text accompanying notes 63-64 supra. The McCloskey court
held that the right of first refusal contract was a statutory sale under § 3(a)(14) of the '34
Act. 450 F. Supp. at 996; see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1976).
15 450 F. Supp. at 996. The court held that the plaintiff's status as beneficial owner of
the stock conferred standing to sue under § 10(b) even though she did not sign the shareholder
agreement which created the right of first refusal. Id. Without doing so explicitly, the court
adopted the de facto seller exception to the purchaser-seller requirement. The de facto seller
exception holds that the party whose economic interests are harmed or benefitted by the
transaction has standing to sue under § 10(b) even though he is not the legal titleholder of
the securities at the time of the sale and is not, therefore, the actual seller. See James v.
Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); 1977-1978 Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 799, 802 n.5 (1978). The McCloskey court granted standing to the plaintiff, stating that
"she was the one who stood to gain or lose by the sale." 450 F. Supp. at 996. Several decisions
have held that the de facto seller exception has survived Blue Chip. E.g., Klamberg v. Roth,
425 F. Supp. 440, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Commentators are divided on whether the exception
has any vitality after Blue Chip. Compare Gallagher, supra note 4, at 12-15, 37-38 and
Standing Uuider Rule 10b-5, supra note 44, at 430 n.104 with Comment, Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores: Failure to Solve the Purchaser-Seller Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 965,
993 (1976).
76 450 F. Supp. at 996-97; see note 15 supra.
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enough to survive defendant's motion to dismiss. 7
The McCloskey case illustrates a current dilemma in the purchaser-
seller area: the extent to which the Blue Chip decision establishes the sole
criteria for determining whether a purchase or sale of securities has oc-
curred. Although most courts profess to use Blue Chip as a guideline, it is
clear the Blue Chip decision is of little help in many standing cases. 8 The
pledge cases and the forced seller cases illustrate this problem most dra-
matically. The '33 and '34 Acts do not address either situation expressly,
but some courts have readily granted standing to defrauded investors in
the absence of an actual purchase or sale.7 Eschewing a too-literal reading
of the "purchase or sale" language of section 10(b), courts have looked
instead to the realities of the transaction to determine whether such a
transaction should be protected under a flexible construction of the federal
securities laws."0
B. Aiding and Abetting
The concept of aiding and abetting in federal securities law, which
derives from the common law concept of aiding and abetting, is designed
to impute liability to those on the periphery of illegal securities transac-
tions.9  Individuals or corporate entities which directly violate section 10(b)
are termed primary violators, while those on the periphery of the illegal
450 F. Supp. at 997.
7 See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978); McCloskey v. McCloskey,
450 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1978); note 25 supra; text accompanying note 68 supra.
1' See, e.g., Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977); McCloskey v. McCloskey, 450
F. Supp. 991, 996-97 (E.D. Pa. 1978); notes 29 & 75 supra.
See notes 29 & 60 supra. But see notes 39 & 41 supra.
, See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 602-
28 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder]; Comment, Rule 10b-5 Liability after Hochfelder:
Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. Cia. L. REv. 218, 221-25, 246 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Rule 10b-5 After Hochfelder]. Several cases have stated that § 876 of
the Restatement of Torts provides the basic standard for aiding and abetting liability under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793,
800 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 318 (1978); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970). Section 876 states:
Persons Acting in Concert.
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person
is liable if he
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions under which
the act is done or intending the consequences which ensue, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939). Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) is substantially
identical to the original.
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transaction are labelled aiders and abettors.2 Although some courts and
commentators have advocated abandoning this distinction,", recent deci-
sions indicate that the aiding and abetting concept, instead of fading away,
is growing in popularity among imaginative pleaders. 4
The Elements of Aiding and Abetting
The traditional elements of a section 10(b) aiding and abetting viola-
tion are: existence of an independent section 10(b) violation, the aider-
abettor's knowledge of the independent violations, and the aider-abettor's
substantial assistance in effecting that violation.8 5 The requirement that
all three elements be proven to establish a section 10(b) aiding and abet-
ting violation has been reaffirmed in a number of recent cases. 6 In particu-
lar, courts in the past year have considered what type of knowledge must
be shown to prove knowledge of the primary violation, and what type of
conduct is sufficient to establish substantial assistance on the part of the
alleged aider-abettor.
8 7
In Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.,"" the Third Circuit was
presented with the question whether a bank should be held liable as an
aider-abettor of its borrower's section 10(b) violations. The court, in rein-
stating the jury verdict against the bank, found that the bank knew of the
primary violation and substantially assisted that violation. 9 In Monsen,
Consolidated maintained a voluntary payroll borrowing program in which
the company made deductions from the salaries of its employees in ex-
change for promissory notes. The note program was not registered with
the SEC and the noteholders received no financial information about Con-
82 See Ruder, supra note 81, at 600; Rule lOb-5 After Hochfelder, supra note 81, at 219-
20.
83 See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Rule lob-5 After Hochfelder, supra
note 81, at 248-54.
8' See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766
(9th Cir. Feb. 1, 1979); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978);
In re. Gap Stores, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,709 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1978);
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
11 See Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978);
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 712 (D.D.C. 1978); Ruder, supra
note 81, at 630-38.
" See note 84 supra.
87 See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co.,[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766
(9th Cir. Feb. 1, 1979) (substantial assistance); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.,
579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978) (knowledge and substantial assistance); SEC v. National Student
Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (knowledge and substantial assistance).
579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 318 (1978).
88 Id. at 799-804. The district court jury found the bank liable as an aider-abettor of
Consolidated's violations of section 12(2) of the '33 Act and section 10(b) of the '34 Act. Id.
at 798-99; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2); 78j(b) (1976); note 2 supra. The jury exonerated the bank
of any direct liability under section 10(b). 579 F.2d at 799.
11 Id. at 796-97. The notes were issued at three month intervals and paid interest at 7%
until maturity, five years later. Id. at 797.
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solidated.9 1 To secure additional financing, Consolidated and a Pennsyl-
vania bank entered into a loan agreement which subordinated the priority
rights of the noteholders.2 Although the noteholders were never informed
that their investment had been subordinated to the bank's secured inter-
est, the bank encouraged Consolidated to continue raising funds by issuing
unsecured promissory notes through the payroll program.13 When Consoli-
dated's financial condition became critical, the bank seized and liquidated
the company's assets. 4 The bank applied the proceeds from liquidation to
the company's outstanding debt to the bank." The noteholders received
nothing."
The Third Circuit analyzed the bank's participation in the Rule 10b-5
violation in terms of the three elements of aiding and abetting liability. 1
First, the court recognized that Consolidated committed independent vio-
lations of section 12 of the '33 Act and section 10(b) of the '34 Act."
Consolidated violated section 10(b) by making misleading statements and
omissions in connection with the note program.9 Second, the court found
that the bank had knowledge of the primary violation.io' The court stated
that to sustain an aiding and abetting charge, evidence must be adduced
showing that the alleged aider-abettor "had a general awareness that his
role was part of an overall activity that [was] improper."'' In concluding
that the bank had knowledge of the independent section 10(b) violation,
the court found that the bank knew that no financial information had been
given to the noteholders, and that the bank acquiesced in Consolidated's
decision not to disclose its financial difficulties and the bank's priority
position to the noteholders."2
" Id. The investors, in making their investment, relied on the reputation of the Silver-
bergs, owners of Consolidated. Id. The noteholders should have received detailed financial
information about Consolidated. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 179 (1953); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77d(2); 77e; 771(2) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 239.146 (1978).
92 579 F.2d at 797-98.




97 Id. at 799-800; see text accompanying note 85 supra.
90 579 F.2d at 798.
11 Id.; see note 91 supra. The trial court also found as a matter of law that Consolidated
violated section 12(1) of the '33 Act by its failure to register the notes. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §
771(1) (1976).
579 F.2d at 801-02.
'o' Id. at 799-800 (citing SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974)). The Monsen
court stated tht the aider-abettor's knowledge of the fraud must be actual knowledge, but
that a less strict requirement may be applied where the aider-abettor derives benefit from
his wrongdoing. 579 F.2d at 799; see Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d
761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974).
102 579 F.2d at 801-02. The Monsen court, in finding that the bank had knowledge of
Consolidated's independent fraud, relied upon the fact that the bank, as a major metropolitan
lending institution, knew or should have known that Consolidated's notes were unregistered
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Third, the court found that the bank substantially assisted Consoli-
dated's independent fraud."0 3 The court considered four factors in deter-
mining the bank's substantial assistance: the amount of assistance given
by the aider-abettor, his presence or absence at the time of the indepen-
dent violation, his relation to the primary violator, and the aider-abettor's
state of mind.' The Monsen court stated that the bank's insistence that
the note program be subordinated to its own secured interest, when com-
bined with the bank's encouragement of Consolidated to continue the note
program, was sufficient to establish the bank's substantial assistance. 05
The court concluded by stating that the bank's knowledge of the note
program alone would not have established its aiding and abetting liabil-
ity.'0" Conversely, the court noted that had the bank required the continua-
tion and subordination of the note program without knowledge of the note-
holder's lack of financial information and Consolidated's decision not to
disclose, the bank's liability would not have been established.0 7 Thus, the
bank's knowledge of Consolidated's nondisclosure, plus the bank's render-




The Third Circuit's decision in Monsen illustrates some of the problems
the concepts of "knowledge" and "substantial assistance" raise in analyz-
ing aiding and abetting liability. Although it is often stated that banks,
brokerage houses, accountants and attorneys should not be held as
"insurers" of their customers' and clients' compliance with the securities
laws, decisions such as Monsen inevitably tend to increase the investiga-
tive responsibilities of these institutions.' As the Monsen court realized,
the task of ascertaining when a "legitimate business relationship between
a lender and a borrower leaves the realm of propriety and enters the do-
main of proscribed conduct" is a difficult one."0 In the absence of evidence
showing self-aggrandizement on the part of the aider-abettor, such as ex-
isted in Monsen, the courts should remain reluctant to impose too high an
investigative duty on lending institutions."'
securities, and that the issuance of those notes without adequate financial information vio-
lated section 12(2) of the '33 Act. Id. at 802; see notes 91 & 99 supra.
103 579 F.2d at 802-03.
M04 Id. at 800. The four factors relied upon by the Monsen court in establishing its sub-
stantial assistance standard were taken from § 876 of the Restatement of Torts. Id.; see note
81 supra.
05 579 F.2d at 802.
106 Id.
107 Id.
MI0 Id. The court stated that although it might not have held the bank liable, the evidence
was sufficient to support a jury verdict. Id. at 803.
10 The Monsen decision seems to place a greater burden upon lending institutions to
investigate the financial position of its borrower's creditors before lending. See note 102 supra.
11 See 579 F.2d at 795.
The Monsen court's decision regarding the bank's knowledge of Consolidated's fraud
is somewhat troubling because the court assumed, without proof, that the bank knew or
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Substantial Assistance: The Duty to Disclose
Courts often establish an aider-abettor's substantial assistance by im-
posing upon the alleged aider-abettor a duty to disclose material informa-
tion."2 This duty to disclose flows from the alleged aider-abettor to the
defrauded plaintiff."3 Either action or inaction on the part of the aider-
abettor can constitute a breach of the duty to disclose."' Breach of a
judicially established duty to disclose material information, according to
several recent decisions, is sufficient to establish the substantial assistance
element of an aiding and abetting charge."'
In SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp."' (NSMC), the federal
district court for the District of Columbia was presented with the issue
whether two attorneys could be held liable as aiders and abettors. The SEC
alleged that the attorneys aided and abetted a section 10(b) violation by
failing to disclose to their client's shareholders adverse financial informa-
tion acquired just before a merger closing."7 The court, agreeing with the
should have known that the note program was illegal. See note 102 supra. The court's state-
ment that a court can impose a low scienter requirement when the defendant derives benefit
from his wrongdoing, however, may provide a clue as to why the Monsen court reinstated the
jury verdict. By assuming a priority position in relation to the noteholders, the bank derived
benefit from its wrongdoing. See 579 F.2d at 798-99, 803 n.17. The court, realizing that the
bank did benefit, may have relaxed its knowledge requirement. Absent justification for such
a relaxed standard, however, imposition of aiding and abetting liability on a lending institu-
tion would seem to broaden peripheral liability beyond acceptable limits.
12 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1978) (duty of
loyalty owed by stockbroker to customer); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (duty of disclosure owed by attorney to his client's shareholders).
See generally Parker, Attorney Liability Under the Securities Laws After Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 10 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 521, 536-53 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Parker].
HI See note 114 infra.
I See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1978); Ruder,
supra note 83, at 641-44. Commentators generally have been hesitant to regard inaction or
silence as substantial assistance. One commentator concluded that inaction should give rise
to an aiding and abetting charge only if the alleged aider-abettor owed the defraudedparty
a duty of disclosure. Ruder, supra note 83, at 644 & n.211. Given such a duty, however, that
commentator stated that liability should be primary, not secondary. Id. at 644.
M See Roll v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &-Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). In Rolf, the Second Circuit
upheld a trial court verdict in favor of an investor who sued his broker for aiding and abetting
the independent fraud of the plaintiff's investment manager. 570 F.2d at 41-47. The court
stated that the broker owed the plaintiff a duty of loyalty, and that the broker breached this
duty by repeatedly assuring the plaintiff of the investment manager's competence. Id. at 47.
Breach of this duty of loyalty, according to the court, amounted to substantial assistance.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 172-90 infra.
16 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
"7 Id. at 687, 700. The National Student Marketing case is the last act of a civil proceed-
ing instituted by the SEC against NSMC and several other defendants. Id. at 686. The
original defendants included NSMC and some of its officers and directors; Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., an accounting firm, and several of its partners; various officers and directors
of Interstate National Corp. the merged corporation; the law firm of White & Case and one
of its partners; and the law firm of Lord, Bissell & Brook and two of its partners. Id. at 686-
87.
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SEC's allegations, held that the attorneys aided and abetted a section
10(b) violation."'
NSMC, a supplier of products for distribution on college campuses,
sought to acquire Interstate, an insurance firm, so that NSMC could sell
insurance to college students."' A merger agreement was prepared, requir-
ing that a "comfort letter"-an accountant's representation as to the cur-
rent financial position of a corporation-be presented by each corpora-
tion's accountant to the other corporation.' The comfort letter was to
state that the accountants had no reason to believe that any material
change had occurred in the corporations' financial position since the earlier
issuance of interim financial statements. 2' During the merger closing,
NSMC's counsel called NSMC's accountant who recited the comfort letter
to counsel.122 The orally reported comfort letter, later transcribed by
NSMC's counsel, revealed that NSMC's previously-reported annual profit
of $700,000 was nonexistent.12 NSMC's counsel then delivered a copy of
the comfort letter to Interstate's directors and Interstate's attorneys, the
defendants in NSMC.'21 The Interstate directors and attorneys, after re-
ceiving the comfort letter, weighed their various alternatives.ln Calling off
the merger just prior to consummation would have been expensive for the
Interstate group because of the short-term profits expected from quick
resale of the newly-acquired NSMC stock.' In addition, the Interstate
"' Id. at 715.
"' Id. at 688.
12 Id. at 690.
121 Id. The comfort letters were to state in full that (1) the auditors had no reason to
believe that the audited interim financial statements of their clients were not prepared in
accordance with accounting and auditing principles consistent with previous audits, (2) the
auditors had no reason to believe that any material adjustments were required to present
fairly the financial position of each company, and (3) each company had experienced no
material adverse change in its financial position since the issuance of the interim financial
statement. Id. Receipt of satisfactory comfort letters from both auditors was a condition
precedent to the merger. Id.
'2 Id. at 691-92.
'2 Id. at 691. The reason for the disappearance of NSMC's profit was that Peat, Marwick
adjusted amortization cash downward by $500,000, and further wrote off $300,000 of receiva-
bles. Id. at 692 & n.18.
124 Id. at 693.
in Id. at 693-94. Schauer, one of Interstate's attorneys, read the letter first. He then
passed the letter to the other Interstate representatives. Id. at 692. The Interstate group then
inquired of NSMC as to the nature and effect of the adjustments. Id. The NSMC group
responded that the adjustments were not material, and merely reflected Peat, Marwick's
desire to "clean up" NSMC's books. Unbeknownst to the Interstate group was the fact that
NSMC was in poor financial condition. See generally J. GOULDEN, THE MILUON DoLLAR
LAwYERs 159-61 (1978).
"1 457 F. Supp. at 693-94. The merger agreement provided that Interstate's shareholders
would receive two shares of NSMC stock for every three shares of Interstate stock they owned.
Id. at 688. This amounted to a 100 percent premium for the surrendered Interstate shares,
based on their market value at the time. Id. at 689 n.7. The officers and directors of Interstate
planned to sell their newly-acquired NSMC stock after the merger. Id. at 688-89.
[Vol. XXXVI
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
directors and attorneys worried that postponing or cancelling the merger
would push down the price of NSMC stock."' Finally, the Interstate group
was concerned about possible stockholders suits for failure to carry out a
favorable merger.' These economic concerns prevailed, and Interstate
agreed to close the merger.' 9 Shortly after the closing, NSMC's true finan-
cial position became known generally, and the SEC sought injunctions
against all parties involved.'
30
The district court stated that two of Interstate's directors committed
primary violations of section 10(b) by closing the merger without resolicit-
ing Interstate's shareholders with corrected financial statements, and that
Interstate's counsel, by failing to interfere with the merger closing after
receipt of the comfort letter, aided and abetted the directors' primary
violation. 3' In discussing the issue whether Interstate's counsel had suffi-
cient knowledge of the primary violation to be liable as aiders-abettors, the
court stated that Interstate's counsel knew the contents of the comfort
letter and the materiality of the financial adjustments.'32 Interstate's coun-
sel also knew that Interstate's shareholders, and the investing public gen-
erally, were unaware of the adjustments contained in the comfort letter.
3
Thus, the court concluded that the attorney-defendants had knowledge of
the primary section 10(b) violation, satisfying the second element of the
aiding and abetting charge.Iu
' Id. at 694.
128 Id.
I" Id. While the Interstate group was deciding whether to close the merger, NSMC's
counsel was conferring with Peat, Marwick. Id. at 695. Peat, Marwick, by this time, had
added two paragraphs to its comfort letter. Id. The first paragraph stated that the adjust-
ments made earlier would result in a net loss for NSMC for the first nine months of 1969,
and that the corporation would break even for the year. Id.; see text accompanying note 123
supra. The second stated Peat, Marwick's recommendation that Interstate shareholders be
resolicited with corrected financial statements. Id. NSMC's attorney responded that the
merger had been closed and therefore the letter was unnecessary. Id.
'3o Id. at 699.
'' Id. at 712. The court first stated that Interstate's directors violated section 10(b) by
failing to disclose the financial information to their shareholders. Id. at 711. The court empha-
sized that the fact that the directors expected to profit from the merger strongly supported a
finding of scienter. Id. The court further stated that should actual intent to deceive, manipu-
late or defraud be absent, the defendant's conduct was clearly reckless and therefore tanta-
mount to willful fraud. Id.; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring).
" 457 F. Supp. at 712-13. The court applied the same scienter requirement to the aiders-
abettors as it imposed on the primary defendants. Id. at 712. The court stated that each
defendant knew the information contained in the comfort letter had not been disclosed prior
to the merger, and that the information was material. Id. at 713. The court distinguished this
situation from one in which the alleged aiders-abettors either merely failed to discover the
fraud or reasonably believed that the victims already knew of the undisclosed information.
Id.; see Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 52 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting); Hirsh v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977).
'l 457 F. Supp. at 713.
'I Id. at 713; see Ruder, supra note 83, at 630-31.
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The court stated that to substantially assist a section 10(b) violation,
the alleged aider-abettor must be aware that he is assisting a section 10(b)
violation.3 ' The court stated that inaction, as well as action, is sufficient
to support the substantial assistance element of an aiding and abetting
charge when the alleged aider-abettor owes a duty to disclose to the de-
fruaded party.' To impute liability to the attorneys, therefore, the court
had to impose a duty to disclose running from Interstate's counsel to Inter-
state's shareholders. 3 ' In establishing a disclosure duty, the NSMC court
reasoned that when it became apparent that the merger was about to be
closed on the basis of materially misleading information, the attorneys'
obligation to their client, Interstate, required the attorneys to take steps
to ensure that the information was disclosed to the shareholders. 3 8 The
court did not delineate the parameters of this duty to disclose, but, did
state that the duty minimally required the attorneys to speak out at the
closing about the materiality of the newly provided financial information
and to make clear that the merger should not be closed until Interstate's
shareholders were resolicited. 13' The court concluded that the attorneys, by
not speaking out, lent an air of legitimacy to the merger closing, and
substantially assisted the primary violation. 4' Confronted with the argu-
ment that the duty to disclose would conflict with the attorney-client
privilege and inhibit client's business judgment, the court responded that
it would not lightly overrule an attorney's conclusions regarding the mate-
riality of the information involved and its need for disclosure.'' The
NSMC court stated, however, that on the facts before it the need for
disclosure of material information clearly outweighed any need for confi-
dentiality.'
"3 457 F. Supp. at 713; see Ruder, supra note 83, at 630-38. The imposition of this test
allows an alleged aider and abettor who knows of the independent fraud and who substan-
tially assists that fraud to escape liability should the plaintiff fail to prove that the aider and
abettor was aware that he was substantially assisting the fraud.
131 457 F. Supp. at 713; see text accompanying note 114 supra.
'3 See 457 F. Supp. at 713.
I's Id. The court, in establishing a duty to disclose material information between an
attorney and his client's shareholders, relied on several cases which had imposed similar
duties. Id.; see Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978); Wood-
ward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 & n.28 (5th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). Although
realizing that the duties established in those cases contemplated disclosure to an opposing
party and not to one's client, the court stated that the cases were "sufficiently analogous to
provide support for a duty here." 457 F. Supp. at 713.
119 Id. at 713. In establishing the duty between the attorneys and the shareholders, the
NSMC court placed some weight upon the fact that the attorneys were learned in securities
law. Id.; see note 158 infra; cf. Escott v. Bar Chris Constr. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 643, 686-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (securities attorney who is director of corporation in order to establish due
diligence defense under § 11(b)(3)(C) of the '33 Act, must satisfy a higher standard of investi-
gation than must a non-attorney defendant).
10 457 F. Supp. at 713.
141 Id.
142 Id. The imposition of the duty on a corporate attorney to disclose material information
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Although the NSMC court did not clearly outline the extent of the
attorney's duty to disclose material information, it is clear from the court's
tone that an attorney's justification for nondisclosure will be subject to a
thorough after the fact analysis. Perhaps the most far reaching aspect of
the case is the court's conclusion that the duty of disclosure between the
attorney and the corporation runs not only to the directors, but also to the
shareholders."' Although it is well-settled that a corporate director owes a
fiduciary duty to shareholders,'" there is little precedent supporting the
court's conclusion that a duty to disclose runs from a corporation's outside
counsel to his client's shareholders. The court's articulation of the attor-
ney's duty to disclose, however, is easier to comprehend when viewed in
the context of the inadequacy of shareholder remedies against a judgment
proof corporation. The NSMC opinion expressly declined to define the
scope of the attorney's duty to disclose, but later cases will no doubt
attempt to define the exact nature of this duty at the expense of a securi-
ties bar caught unawares. Although it is rueful that the securities bar has
been left with no easily discernible aiding and abetting standard after
NSMC, this concern must be weighed against the fact that corporate
shareholders, unequipped with effective tools to ward off securities law
fraud, should be allowed to look to corporate attorneys to guard share-
holder interests against the excesses of corporate directors. The NSMC
case will at least bring about a long needed reexamination of the relation-
ship between the lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility and the need
for full and fair disclosure under the federal securities laws.
4 5
to his client's shareholders requires the attorney to weigh any information which might later
prove damaging to shareholder interests. Determining whether a certain piece of information
is material is a difficult task. In the context of the duty of disclosure owed by a corporate
director to a shareholder, the Supreme Court has stated that a fact is material if "there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote." TSC Indus., Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The Court stated
that the question of materiality is an objective one, involving the significance of an omitted
or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor. Id. at 445. The imposition of such a standard
regarding a misleading proxy statement, given the existence of a fiduciary duty between a
director and a shareholder, does not seem unreasonable. Whether such a duty should be
imposed on outside counsel, however, has been questioned. See Parker, supra note 114, at
546-51.
One of the difficulties in establishing a duty of disclosure between a securities practi-
tioner and the investing public is that the attorney's precise responsibilities in a securities
transaction are difficult to identify. Id. at 551-52. In contrast, an accountant may use good
faith adherence to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles as a shield against § 10(b)
aiding and abetting liability. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,766 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 1979). No such carefully delineated set of instructions exists
for a securities practitioner. See Parker, supra note 112, at 551-52.
3 See 457 F. Supp. at 713-14. The NSMC court characterized the duty between the
outside corporate counsel and its clients' shareholders as a fiduciary duty. Id.
' See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 364 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326,
1334 (7th Cir. 1969).
M By redefining the scope and breadth of the attorney's duty, NSMC will force the
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Substantial Assistance and the Duty
to Investigate
Accountants, by the nature of their profession, have long owed a duty
to disclose material information to a client's shareholders. An accountant's
certified audit, prepared for the corporate client, is usually the sole crite-
rion upon which a corporate shareholder can make an informed investment
decision. Although this duty to disclose is clear, what is less clear is the
extent of the accountant's duty to investigate his client's financial position
while preparing his report. A recent Ninth Circuit decision has examined
the question of how thorough an accountant's investigation need be in
order to avoid section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability.
attorney to consider the impact of information on shareholders, not just directors. In this
respect, NSMC is similar to Bar Chris. See Escott v. Bar Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643, 686-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Bar Chris, the court found an attorney-director liable for
signing a misleading registration statement. Id. at 690. In commenting on the attorney's
attempt to establish his "due diligence" defenses under § 11(b)(3)(C) of the '33 Act, the court
stated that the attorney-director would have to satisfy a higher standard of due diligence than
would the other director-defendants because of his expertise in the federal securities laws.
Id. at 690; see 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976). The NSMC court seemed to take Bar Chris to
heart when it stated that the aiders-abettors, because they failed to speak at the closing
regarding the problems with the merger, lent an air of legitimacy to the transaction. 457 F.
Supp. at 713.
The NSMC court refered to the attorney's responsibilities to his corporate client. Id. at
713-14. The court seemed to define the corporate client as including the shareholders, since
it is this group to which the attorney's duty to disclose runs. Id. The ramifications of NSMC,
assuming the above to be true, are unsettling to corporate counsel. The attorney aiders-
abettors in NSMC relied on "business judgment" as a defense, implying that their decision
not to disclose was based upon their belief that the factors opposing consummation of the
merger did not outweigh those factors supporting the closing. See id. at 693-94, 713; text
accompanying notes 127-29 supra. The NSMC court, by stating that such a business judg-
ment would not suffice to justify non-disclosure of such material information, placed corpo-
rate counsel in the difficult position of both looking out for shareholder interests and giving
corporate officers and directors advice regarding the probable legality of their conduct. Given
the differing interests between corporate boards and shareholders, attorney decisions in light
of NSMC will be difficult indeed. Also, in a situation in which there exist two warring factions
of shareholders, it is difficult to perceive to which group of shareholders an attorney's duty
will run. The risks an attorney takes in deciding whether to disclose information to sharehold-
ers is great, because the SEC has the power to suspend, either temporarily or permanently,
an attorney whose actions constitute either "unethical or improper conduct." See 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(e)(1) (1978).
A recent SEC administrative action under rule 2(e) has further confused a securities bar
already confounded by NSMC. The SEC alleged that two attorneys, by failing to ensure that
a director reveal his company's credit problems to the other directors and shareholders, aided
and abetted a section 10(b) violation. In re Carter, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 494, March
14, 1979, at A-13; see SEC Slap: Heavy Blow to Lawyers, April 9, 1979, at 1, col. 1-2. An
administrative law judge (ALJ), proceeding under the theory that an attorney need not
violate the securities laws in order to be held liable as an aider-abettor, suspended the two
attorneys from practice for one year. In re Carter, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 494, March
14, 1979, at A-13. The Carter case has been viewed with considerable trepidation by the
securities bar. See Bialkin, Commission's Latest 2(e) Proceeding Profoundly Disquiets Secur-
ities Bar, The Nat'l L.J., April 30, 1979, at 25, col. 1.
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In SEC v. Arthur Young & Co.,' the SEC charged Arthur Young, an
accounting firm, with aiding and abetting an independent section 10(b)
violation. 4 7 The Commission asserted that Arthur Young prepared its
audit "with blinders on," and that the firm should have done more to
reveal to investors the illegal conduct of the corporation's management. 46
The defendant argued that good faith compliance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), a standard requiring the exercise of "due
professional care," should satisfy an accountant's duty to investigate and
therefore immunize the defendant from any section 10(b) aiding and abet-
ting liability."9 The standard advanced by the SEC, according to the court,
for determining whether an accountant adequately performed his func-
tions is whether he conducted his audit in a manner that would reveal to
an ordinarily prudent investor a reasonably accurate reflection of the fin-
ancial risk such an investor would bear if he invested in the corporation. 5
The court rejected the SEC's standard, stating that an auditor is neither
an insurer of his client's compliance with the securities laws, nor an en-
forcement arm of the SEC.'51 Concluding that Arthur Young proved good
faith compliance with GAAP, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court
-" [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 1979).
M Id. at 95,005. The Arthur Young case grew out of the Jack Burke-Geotek oil fraud
cases. SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In Geotek, the SEC brought suit
against Burke, Geotek, and Arthur Young, alleging that Burke, through Goetek, violated §
10(b) by making material misrepresentations and/or omissions in Geotek's offering circulars,
oil exploration program agreements, prospectuses, limited partnership agreements and man-
agement agreements. The SEC also alleged that Arthur Young, Burke and Geotek's accoun-
tants, aided and abetted Burke's violations by making material misstatements and/or omis-
sions in its audit report certifications of the Burke and Geotek financial documents. Id. at
725-26.
I" [Current] FED. Szc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766 at 95,006. The SEC charged that Arthur
Yound, in the performance of its duties, either knew or should have known of the primary
defendants' fraud. SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 730 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In essence, the
SEC charged that Arthur Young should have done a more thorough audit of Burke and
Geotek. Id. at 759. The trial court, disagreeing with the SEC, directed an entry of final
judgment for Arthur Young. Id. at 731.
" [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766 at 96,006. The general standards to be
used by accountants in preparing their audits are that the audit should be prepared by.
someone with adequate training, that independence be maintained by the accountant, and
that the accountant exercise due professional care while preparing the audit. AICPA,
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, STATEMENTS ON AuDrrnGo STANDARDS, No. 1, § 150.01. Exercise of
due professional care requires the accountant to review his product critically, but does not
guarantee infallability or perfect judgment. Id. at §§ 230.02; 230.03. In particular, an audit
made in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) cannot be ex-
pected to guarantee that a client's illegal acts will be detected. Id. at § 328.03.
110 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766 at 95,006. The standard proposed by the
SEC imposes a stricter investigative duty upon accountants than do GAAP. See AICPA,
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, STATEMENTS ON AuDrrsno STANDARDS, No. 1, § 150.01.
"' [Current] FED. SEC. L. RsP. (CCH) 96,766 at 95,006-07. The Arthur Young court
stated that the SEC's demanding standard amounts to a conscription bill directed towards
accountants. Id. Unfortunately for the SEC, stated the court, Congress has yet to pass such
a bill. Id.
1979]
922 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
verdict in favor of the firm.' 2
Although NSMC and Arthur Young dealt with different duties and
professions, it is noteworthy that the court in Arthur Young, unlike NSMC,
precisely delineated the scope of the duty owed. 53 The NSMC court, in
establishing a duty to disclose material information running from the at-
torney to the shareholder, rejected the attorney's contention that no such
duty should exist due to the fact that the ABA Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Code) forbids disclosure of attorney-client communications.' 5
The Arthur Young court carefully limited the parameters of the accoun-
tant's duty to investigate, accepting the accountant's assertion that their
duty is fully set forth in GAAP.'55 The crucial distinction between Arthur
Young and NSMC, however, may well lie in the profession involved rather
than the duty owed or the respective merits of the Code and GAAP.
Section 10(b) aiding and abetting was designed to impute liability to
peripheral actors in a securities law violation. 5' There must be some peri-
phery of action, therefore, beyond which aiding and abetting liability will
not lie. In order to define this boundary, Monsen, NSMC and Arthur
Young looked to what the defrauded party could expect of the professionals
involved, and to what was expected of these professionals generally. The
NSMC court, in holding that an attorney owed a duty to disclose material
information to his client's shareholders, was heavily influenced by the
active role played by the attorneys in the merger.' 57 Lawyers, according to
NSMC, lend an appearance of legitimacy to a transaction.'58 For this rea-
son, courts will closely scrutinize their conduct and hold them to high
standards. Adherence to the Code will not absolve an attorney from section
10(b) liability when he knows, or should know, that shareholder interests
are endangered by management actions.'55 In Monsen, the defendant bank
5I [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766 at 95,007. The court stated that good
faith compliance was necessary to absolve Arthur Young from section 10(b) liability since
deliberate concealment of a material fact, even though the accountant literally complies with
GAAP, is no shield. Id.; see United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
" See text accompanying notes 139 & 151 supra.
'" 457 F. Supp. at 713; see note 145 supra.
"3 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,766 at 95,006.
" See text accompanying note 82 supra. Various cases in the past year have dealt with
the question of whether respondeat superior is an appropriate method for the imposition of
peripheral liability in the federal securities law field. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon
& Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (employer of aider-abettor admitted liability); SEC v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (employer of aider-abettor
admitted liability); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (court
holds employer liable on respondeat superior theory). Whether respondeat superior can be
squared with the Ernst & Ernst scienter requirement has been the subject of some contro-
versy. See EIGHTH ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. REGULATIONS (A. Fleishner, R. Mundheim, B. Vande-
grift, eds. 1977) 369-75.
,"7 457 F. Supp. at 713; see notes 139 & 145 supra.
"3457 F. Supp. at 713.
"3 See id.; note 145 supra.
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probably would not have been held liable as an aider-abettor but for evi-
dence showing its self-aggrandizement in the transaction.' 0 Absent evi-
dence tending to show self-aggrandizement, a lending institution should
not be held liable as an aider-abettor, because the bank's role in tle trans-
action, although significant, probably does not induce shareholder reliance
or trust to the extent that an attorney's actions would.'"' The Arthur Young
decision imposes the lowest burden. Accountants, unlike lawyers, do not
lend an air of legitimacy to a transaction. Accountants do not insure the
truthfulness of their audits, only the integrity of their preparation.'62 So
long as the accountant satisfies the GAAP investigation standard, section
10(b) aiding and abetting liability should not lie. The battle between the
SEC's expanded recovery-watchdog theories and the professional's desire
to avoid peripheral liability should guarantee that the aiding and abetting
area will remain among the most lively in the domain of section 10(b).
C. ScMETM
The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'6 3
firmly established that negligent conduct is insufficient to support a pri-
vate damages action brought under section 10(b) of the '34 Act'64 and Rule
10b-5.16' Although the Hochfelder decision resolved a conflict among the
circuits by eliminating negligence as a basis for liability in a private dam-
ages action,'66 the Court refused to specify the degree of culpability neces-
sary to establish liability in a private action.' Moreover, the Hochfelder
decision did not specify the degree of culpability the SEC must prove in
an injunctive action. In attempting to resolve these two questions, lower
federal courts have reached conflicting results.
610 See note 112 supra.
6", Banks, like accountants, do not lend an air of legitimacy to i transaction.. They only
finance transactions.
H62 See AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, No. 1, §
230.03; note 149 supra.
M 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Hochfelder Court held that a private action for damages
could not be maintained without an allegation of scienter. Id. at 193. The Court did not hold
that the specific intent to deceive was necessary, just that mere negligence by the defendant
would not suffice. Id. at 293 n.12; see Note, Rule 10b-5 Liability After Hochfelder: Abandon-
ing the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CmI. L. REv. 218, 231 (1978); 1976-1977
Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 882, 910 n.176 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1976-1977 Developments].
1,' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); note 2 supra.
"6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978); note 3 supra.
,66 Before the Supreme Court decided Hochfelder, eight circuit courts had ruled on the
question of the requisite degree of culpability in private damages actions. See generally
Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213, 213-14 n.6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo]; Note,
The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) After Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 419, 420 n.6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Scienter
Requirement].
"67 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
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1. Private Damage Actions
One of the questions left unanswered by Hochfelder was whether reck-
less conduct satisfies the Court's scienter requirement for a Rule 10b-5
violation.'68 The common law actions of misrepresentation and deceit re-
quired proof of scienter. 69 Reckless behavior, as well as intentional or
knowing conduct, were regarded as forms of scienter sufficient to support
these common law actions. 70 Courts since Hochfelder, consistent with
I Id.
"' See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 684-86 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. The leading common law case on fraud, Derry v. Peek,
[1889] 14 A.C. 337, 374, held that to prove fraud the plaintiff must prove that a false
misrepresentation had been made "(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3)
recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." See PROSSER, supra, § 107, at 669. In actions
for fraud, the majority of American courts have accepted Derry's holding, and have required
proof of one of the culpable states of mind, which became known as scienter. Id. at 669-700.
1To Id. at 700-01; A. BROMBERG, SEcURTrrIEs LAW: FRAUD § 84 (503), at 204.103 (1975); 3
Loss, supra note 39, at 1432. See generally Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10-b5, 67 Nw. U. L.
REv. 562 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo, Scienter]; Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hoch-
felder and 10b-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Haimoff].
When a misrepresentation or omission is made five states of mind are possible. (1) The
defendant may have honestly believed the statement to be true, with his belief based on solid
reasoning and factual analysis, yet external factors cause the statement to be false; or the
defendant omitted to reveal a material fact when a reasonable man either would not have
known the fact or, if he knew it, not known the fact was material. (2) The defendant may
have honestly believed the statement to be true, but a reasonable man would not have made
the statement without further factual basis; or through negligence the defendant did not know
the omitted fact, or if he knew it, negligently did not know the omitted fact was material.
(3) The defendant believed his statement to be true, but there was no basis for the belief; or
the defendant was reckless in either not knowing of the fact or not knowing of its materiality.
(4) The defendant knew his statement was false; or the defendant knew the omitted fact was
material. (5) The defendant knew the statement was false and intended the statement to
catise injury; or the defendant intended the omitted fact to cause harm. See Bucklo, Scienter,
supra, at 568; Scienter Requirement, supra, note 166, at 419. The states of mind described
above in (3), (4) or (5) satisfied the common law scienter requirement. See, e.g., PROSSER,
supra note 169, at 701; Bucklo, Scienter, supra, at 569. See also Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14
A.C. 337, 374. The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws are based on common
law principles. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1978);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1977).
The Hochfelder court defined scienter as the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
425 U.S. at 194 n.12. This language could be read to mean that the defendant must intend
to bring about a specific result, the defrauding of the plaintiff, before Rule 10b-5 is violated.
See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45-46; Scienter Requirement, supra
note 166, at 419 n.2. The Hochfelder Court did not, however, exclude recklessness as a state
of mind capable of supporting a Rule 10b-5 violation. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12. Therefore, since
the Court did not express any intent to break from settled common law standards, the court
clearly did not intend to preclude liability in a private damage action where the defendant
acted recklessly, but only to preclude liability for "mere negligence." Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470 (1977). See generally Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisal in Light of Hoch-
felder, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 769 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Berner & Franklin]; Lowenfels,
Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: A
Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels]; Note, SEC
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common law precedent, have uniformly held that reckless conduct is suffi-
cient to support private damage actions under Rule 10b-5.Y11
Two federal circuit courts recently considered the culpability require-
ment in private damage actions and held that reckless as well as knowing
conduct meets the Hochfelder standard. In Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon
& Co.,1 the Second Circuit concluded that the reckless conduct of an
alleged aider and abettor of a Rule 10b-5 violation' satisfied the scienter
requirement. The court limited its holding, however, by addressing only
those situations where a fiduciary relationship exists. 4 In Rolf, a regis-
tered representative of Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co. (BEDCO) was found
liable for aiding and abetting the Rule 10b-5 violation of an independent
investment advisor.'7 5 The broker's misrepresentations arose from his con-
tinued assurances to the plaintiff that the investment advisor was doing a
good job managing the plaintiff's account, was, a competent investment
advisor, and was one in whom the plaintiff could repose his trust. The
investment advisor's purchases, most of which were made through the
broker and BEDCO, steadily declined in value during the period in which
the statements were made to the plaintiff.' Even though the plaintiff's
broker thought that some of the securities bought for the account were
"junk", the district court found that the broker was ignorant of the invest-
ment advisor's fraudulent stock manipulations.'77 The court concluded,
however, that the broker's statements were made with reckless disregard
as to their truth or falsity.78
Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Scienter.
Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 831 (1977).
"I See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir. 1978);
Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 252 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978);
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1978);
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1976). See
generally 1977-1978 Securitiess Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 799,
827 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977-1978 Developments].
1- 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 642 (1978).
' See text accompanying notes 81-162 supra.
7 570 F.2d at 44 n.9. The Rolf court expressly refused to decide whether recklessness
satisfies the scienter requirement where the alleged aider and abettor owes no duty of disclo-
sure or loyalty to the defrauded party. Id.
"I Id. at 41-44. When Yamada, the investment advisor, took over Dr. Rolf's portfolio on
May 9, 1969, the plaintiff's equity was $1,423,000. By March 29, 1970, the value of the
portfolio had dropped to $446,000. The district court concluded that the investment advisor
had engaged in fraudulent manipulation of the plaintiff's stocks. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). BEDCO's registered representative
was to work closely with the investment advisor in the selection and purchase of stocks, and
generally supervise the management of the plaintiffs account. In fact, the plaintiff trusted
the pair to the extent that he gave broad authorization to the investment advisor with full
trading discretion and left his account with BEDCO's representative. The investment advisor
settled with the plaintiff out of court and was not a party to the instant action. 570 F.2d at
41 n.2.
"I8 Id. at 42-43.
'u 424 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
' Id. at 1042.
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The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that the broker's
conduct was reckless.' The circuit court based its decision that reckless-
ness constituted scienter on four grounds. First, the fiduciary relationship
compels a recklessness standard for the scienter requirement.' A fiduciary
must adhere to special rules of conduct and is expected to fairly and fully
disclose to the person he owes the fiduciary duty.'"' Since the broker in Rolf
was a fiduciary, he owed a special duty to the plaintiff and was obligated
to act in the plaintiff's best interest. The Rolf court stated that liability
based on the recklessness of a fiduciary was not the same as liability based
on negligence, a standard of culpability expressly disapproved by the
Hochfelder court.1 2 The second basis offered by the court for holding that
reckless behavior met the Supreme Court's scienter requirement was the
common law concept of knowing conduct. 1 Hochfelder defined scienter as
"knowing or intentional misconduct.' '8 The Rolf court reasoned that
scienter included the common law concept of knowing conduct and that
recklessness was a form of knowing conduct at common law. The court
concluded that since the federal securities laws are based on common law
concepts, scienter must include recklessness for purposes of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.'15 Third, the Rolf court found that the precedent of the
Second Circuit, developed both before and after Hochfelder, held that
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. 8' Finally, the court did not
want to impose a seemingly impossible burden of proof on a plaintiff by
requiring proof of the specific intent to deceive or defraud.' The court
stated that to require proof of the specific intent to defraud would
"1' 570 F.2d at 44, 48. Because of the fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the
broker, the court obviously felt that the broker had a duty to inquire about Yamada's dealings
before assuring the plaintiff of the quality of the investments. Id. at 47-48.
,8 Id. at 45.
" See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, at 679-80 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as DOBBS].
' 570 F.2d at 45. At common law a fiduciary must do more than simply avoid misleading
by half-truths or active concealment. DOBBS, supra note 181, at 680. A fiduciary has the duty
to fully disclose material information. If a fiduciary does not fully disclose, either because of
a conscious decision or a reckless ignorance of the truth, he is liable to the party to whom he
owes the duty. This breach of fiduciary duty was known at common law as equitable or
constructive fraud. Id. at 679.
19 570 F.2d at 45; see notes 169-70 supra.
1" 425 U.S. at 197.
"9 570 F.2d at 45-46; see note 170 supra.
lAG 570 F.2d at 46 (citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
banc) and Shentob v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971)). The court
cited several cases from other circuits holding that the recklessness standard is consistent
with Hochfelder. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040, 1043-45 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1978); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1080-82 (D. Del. 1976).
" Specific intent is an intent to bring about a particular result, such as the deception
of a plaintiff. Cf. Note, Proving Discriminatory Intent From a Facially Neutral Decision With
a Disproportionate Impact, 36 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 109, 118 (1978).
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"disembowel the private cause of action under § 10(b)"' and require a
standard of proof never thought necessary at common law. The Rolf major-
ity was careful not to impose liability for wholly faultless conduct'59 by
defining reckless conduct as conduct that was "highly unreasonable" and
which portrayed "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care. .. to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant
or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.""' Using this
standard, no purely negligent conduct could be held to violate Rule 10b-5.
In Nelson v. Serwold,'5' a case involving a failure to disclose material
facts, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant could violate Rule 10b-5
with either knowing or reckless conduct.9 2 In Nelson, the defendant was
president of a group of investors"3 who owned a majority of Poulsbo Rural
Telephone Association (Poulsbo Telephone) stock."4 During the settle-
ment of the estate of a relative of the plaintiff,95 the defendant was asked
1" 570 F.2d at 47. In dissent, Judge Mansfield disagreed with the legal standard em-
ployed by the majority. Judge Mansfield would impose liability for aiding and abetting a
violation of Rule 10b-5 only if the aider-abetter "deliberately shut his eyes to the obvious,
such as material facts that would be patent upon a mere cursory examination or review." Id.
at 52. The dissent concluded that the majority was imposing liability for mere negligence, a
standard contrary to the specific holding in Hochfelder. Id.
The dissent seems to overlook the fact that an affirmative misrepresentation can be
"made by one who is conscious that he has no sufficient basis of information to justify [it]."
PROSSER, supra note 169, at 701. The dissent's standard would allow a statement to be made
without any regard to the actual facts underlying the situation. If a person knows he does
not have sufficient basis for his statements, he acts intentionally. See example 5, note 170.
Moreover, requiring deliberate action means that there must be a conscious decision not to
investigate. Implicit in the standard proposed by the dissent is the requirement that the
plaintiff prove that the defendant had the intent to defraud before an action under Rule 10b-
5 will lie. Requiring proof of intentional or knowing conduct would make the standard under
Rule 10b-5. more exacting than the standard required for proof of common law fraud. See
Haimoff, supra note 170, at 151; 1976-1977 Developments, suppa note 163, at 921. Under a
recklessness standard, a defendant must at least make himself aware of obvious facts. See
1975-1976 Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 937 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1975-1976 Developments]. A departure from such a standard would
encourage defendants to neglect their fiduciary duties and would eliminate any incentive to
make a reasonable investigation, thereby lowering the protection afforded by the common
law. Such a result was not intended by the Hochfelder Court and was correctly rejected by
the Rolf majority.
189 570 F.2d at 46 n.15.
" Id. at 47 (quoting Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)).
"' 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 464 (1978).
292 Id. The actual communications providing the basis of the suit were between the
defendant and an attorney for a relative of the plaintiff during an attempt to settle the
relative's estate. Id. at 1334.
"I Id. at 1334-35. Fifty-six per cent of the Poulsbo Rural Telephone Association stock was
owned by a control group. The group bought the stock with plans to modernize the company
and make it into a marketable entity which would eventually be sold for a substantial profit.
Id. at 1334.
" Id. Poulsbo Telephone was a small, antiquated telephone company operating in the
state of Washington. Id.
195 Id. at 1334-35; see note 191 supra.
19791
928 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
to reveal the status of thirty-six'shares of Poulsbo Telephone stock which
had been issued to the deceased.'96 In the negotiations between the parties
for the sale of the stock, neither the existence nor the plans of the control
group"9 7 were revealed by the defendant. In an attempt to buy the stock,
the defendant originally offered $5.00 per share9 " which the plaintiff, be-
cause he had no other information, assumed was the fair market value. "
The parties eventually agreed upon a price of $6.94 per share, although the
stock had a book value of approximately $60.00 per share.20 When the
control group sold the stock in 1971 to United Utilities, Inc.,2 01 (United)
each share of Poulsbo Telephone was exchanged for a block of twenty-five
shares of United stock worth approximately $500.00.
In reaching a decision in Nelson,"'2 the Ninth Circuit analyzed the scope
of the Hochfelder scienter requirement. The court concluded that the Su-
preme Court had held only that negligent conduct would not violate Rule
10b-5, not that the specific intent to defraud was required."3 Relying on
decisions subsequent to Hochfelder, 2 4 and the statements of distinguished
jurists2 15 prior to Hochfelder, the Nelson court held that scienter included
knowing or reckless conduct.29 The court found that the failure of the
defendant to inform the plaintiff of the control group's existence and of
their plan to upgrade Poulsbo Telephone and eventually sell it was done
with "knowledge"." 7 By finding that the defendant knew of his omis-
sions, 2 the court determined that the defendant knew that the informa-
tion about the control group and its long-range plans would be material"'
"' 576 F.2d at 1334-35.
"9 Id. at 1336; see note 193 supra.
, 576 F.2d at 1335.
119 Id.; see note 210 infra.
2®0 576 F.2d at 1335.
201 Id.
202 Id. The district court's opinion was handed down before Hochfelder and relied on
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (no scienter necessary in Rule 10b-5
private damages action), and Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (rejection of scienter standard). The district court also found that
the defendants did not act "deliberately" or "cold-bloodedly" to defraud the plaintiffs. 576
F.2d at 1337. With the change in the law announced by Hochfelder, the Ninth Circuit had
to determine if the district court had premised its holding on negligence or if some form of
scienter was present. Id. The circuit court concluded that the evidence supported a finding
of recklessness. Id. at 1338.
203 Id.; see note 163 supra.
2014 Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976); McLean v. Alexander,
420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del. 1976).
205 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Kohn V. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458
F.2d 255, 280-81 (3rd Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972).
206 576 F.2d at 1337.
207 Id.
208 Id.
20 The court stated that "a statement or an omission is material if it reasonably could
have been expected to influence the decision to sell." Id. at 1335.
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to the Nelson estate's determination whether to sell and the price to ask
for the stock. The court held that actual knowledge of materiality, coupled
with a conscious decision not to reveal, is knowing conduct within the
meaning of scienter established by Hochfelder and at common law.210
The Second Circuit in Rolf and the Ninth Circuit in Nelson joined an
overwhelming majority of courts holding that recklessness satisfies the
Hochfelder Court's requirement of scienter in Rule 10b-5 private damage
actions.2 1 ' Neither case imposes liability for purely negligent conduct.
2 12
21, 576 F.2d at 1337-38. At common law scienter included knowing conduct. See PROSSER,
supra note 169, at 700-01; Haimoff, supra note 170, at 157; Scienter Requirement, supra note
166, at 419; 1975-1976 Developments, supra note 188, at 937. The type of conduct described
in Nelson corresponds with example four, note 170.
In addition to finding knowing conduct, the Nelson court determined that the evaluation
of the "status" of the stock, referring to the fair market value of the stock, was reckless.
Although this evaluation was actually done by the defendant's attorney, the court imputed
this recklessness to the defendant. 576 F.2d at 1338. Even though the reasoning of the court
is not particularly clear, the alternative finding that the evaluation of the status of the stock
was reckless could be interpreted to mean that the defendants were reckless in not knowing
the materiality of their omission, thus fulfilling one part of the recklessness test developed
by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.
1977). In Sundstrand, the Seventh Circuit developed a two part test for determining reckless-
ness that requires proof of both an objective and subjective component. The objective compo-
nent of the test is fulfilled by actual knowledge of material facts or by a total disregard of
that knowledge. These facts must be so obvious to any reasonable man that the defendant is
legally bounil as knowing them. Id. at 1045. The subjective element of the Sundstrand test
is fulfilled by an intentional decision, as opposed to an unintentional one, not to reveal the
information. Id. See 1977-1978 Developrhents, supra note 171, at 829-30. Therefore, since the
defendant in Nelson knowingly did not reveal the control group's existence, and was reckless
in not knowing the materiality of the omission, the defendant satisfied both the objective and
subjective elements of the Sundstrand test.
Another decision holding that recklessness satisfies the Hochfelder scienter requirement
is Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In Sharp, an employee of
the defendant accounting firm allegedly made material misrepresentations and omissions
recklessly or with an intent to defraud. The misrepresentations and omissions were contained
in an opinion letter explaining the federal tax consequences of investments in a limited
partnership interest in an oil drilling venture. After a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty
of violating Rule 10b-5, the defendant made motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial
claiming that recklessness did not satisfy the Hochfelder requirement. The court rejected this
assertion, relying on Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 99 S.Ct. 106 (1978). The defendant also claimed that the court had incorrectly
charged the jury about the meaning of scienter. The jury was charged with the definition of
recklessness developed in Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D.
Okla. 1976). The Franke court stated:
Reckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or
sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.
Id. at 725. Serious consideration by the jury of the Franke language could not possibly lead
to a finding of liability for purely negligent conduct. Therefore, the Hochfelder requirement
was satisfied.
2I See note 171 supra.
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Both decisions support the policies of full disclosure and reasonable inves-
tigation by persons buying and selling securities and effectuate the com-
mon law doctrines that underlie the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws.213
212 But see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 52 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield,
J., dissenting); note 189 supra.
The Fifth Circuit also has stated that the SEC must prove scienter in an injunctive
action. See text accompanying notes 225-31 infra. In SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir.
1978), however, a negligence standard may have been employed mistakenly. In Blatt the
defendant was the personal attorney for a co-defendant and corporate counsel for Corporation
of the Americas Limited [COAL]. Id. at 1328. When the defendants learned that Exquisite
Form Industries, Inc. [Exquisite] wanted to purchase a block of COAL stock, they made
material omissions to several COAL shareholders to entice them into selling their stock. After
holding the stock for less than six months, the defendants sold the stock and made $315,000
on their $59,662 investment. Approximately one year later when Exquisite planned a merger
with COAL, the defendant transferred his COAL stock into trust so that the trustee could go
on record as opposed to the merger. By opposing the merger, the defendant hoped to work
out a more favorable deal for his stock. The district court found that the defendant's failure
to inform sellers of COAL stock of the likelihood of the sale to Exquisite, his failure to inform
Exquisite management of his beneficial ownership of COAL stock, and his failure to inform
Exquisite of his objection to the COAL-Exquisite merger, were all material omissions. Id. at
1332. Because the Fifth Circuit requires proof of scienter in SEC injunction actions, as well
as private damages suits, see text accompanying notes 225-32 infra, the court had to deter-
mine if the defendants possessed the mental state required to violate Rule 10b-5. The court
stated
The record in this action reveals knowing omissions by each appellant. The court
below found that Blatt and Pullman had inside knowledge. Unquestionably they
knew that the information was not disclosed to sellers of COAL stock. Their con-
duct, in our judgment, encompassed just the type of "knowing or intentional mis-
conduct" that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe.
Id. at 1334. This reasoning is flawed, however, because the court focused on the wrong type
of "knowing". Unless the defendants simply forgot to reveal the information, see 1977-1978
Developments, supra note 171, at 829, their omissions were knowing in that they realized they
were not disseminating all the information they possessed. The Blatt defendants did not
simply forget to reveal the material information. The "knowing or intentional" conduct that
§ 10(b) proscribes, however, is the knowledge that the information withheld is material or
that the statements made are false. See note 170 supra. Unless the defendant knows the
information is material or acts in reckless disregard of that knowledge, see note 170 supra,
Rule 10b-5 is not applicable. The Blatt court failed to recognize the Hochfelder focus on
scienter as a state of mind, in that one may be aware of the facts, yet not have an intent to
deceive because he believes that the facts omitted are not material or that the omission does
not make other representations misleading. See BLOOMENTHAL, FED. SEC. CORP. L. REP. 16
(1979). The standard applied in Blatt would punish not only negligent conduct, but purely
innocent conduct as well.
Moreover, the court declined to define reckless conduct. 583 F.2d 1334 n.27. The standard
purportedly used by the Blatt court is knowing conduct, see note 170 supra (example four),
rather than recklessness. Common law "knowing conduct", sufficient for proof of scienter,
requires actual proof that the defendant knew his statement was false or that his omission
would have a false impression. See PROSSER, supra note 169, at 686; notes 169-70 supra.
Simple proof that the speaker knew more information than he revealed is not "knowing"
conduct as that term is used at common law. See notes 169-70 supra.
2I See notes 169-70 supra.
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2. SEC Injunctive Actions
Another question left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder
was whether scienter must be proven in SEC injunctive actions.2"4 The
SEC brings injunctive actions to protect the investing public from future
violations of the securities law. 2 5 Since an investor is harmed as much by
negligent conduct that causes injury as by an action undertaken with
scienter,2 1 some courts have required the SEC to prove only simple negli-
gence to establish a violation of Rule 10b-5. 2 7 Other courts have held that
the scienter standard for private damage suits must apply in SEC actions
because of the harsh remedies available to the SEC, including the power
to force restitution or a disgorgement of profits, 2 1 the appointment of a
receiver, ' an accounting, 20 and freeze orders on a company's stock.2 2' In
addition, the possibility of collateral use of an SEC injunctive order in a
subsequent private damage22 or criminal suit2u underscores the severity of
" The Court in Hochfelder expressly refused to decide whether scienter was necessary
in a suit for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
2,5 E.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Western Geothermal & Power Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,590, at 94,524 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 1978); 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 163, at 911-
12. The SEC is authorized to bring injunctive actions by § 20(b) of the '33 Act, and § 21(d)
of the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) and 78u(d) (1976). The standard for granting an injunction
is whether there is "positive proof of a reasonable likelihood of future illegal conduct." SEC
v. Wills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712 at 94,771 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1978); see
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977). The district court in Wills
identified several important factors a court considers before granting an injunction: whether
there is proof of fraud or scienter, whether the violations were technical or flagrant and
outrageous, whether the defendants realized they violated the securities laws and whether
they were in position to continue these violations, and whether the violation was an isolated
incident or involved many violations. SEC v. Wills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T
96,712, at 94,772 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1978); see SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574
F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir.
1972).
2 6 See SEC General Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA), No. 354 at F-1 - F-2 (May 26, 1976); Floor, The Scienter
Requirement Under Rule 10b-5 and Reliance on Advice of Counsel After Hochfelder, 12 NEW
ENGL. L. REV. 191, 208-13 (1976).
S,? See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Western Geothermal & Power Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REr. (CCH)
96,590 at 94,923 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 1978).
"I1 See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1327 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d
1301, 1305 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1098 (2d Cir.
1972).
21 See e.g., SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 448 F. 2d 546 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Arkansas
Loan & Thrift Corp., 427 F. 2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Barlett, 422 F.2d 475 (8th Cir.
1970).
22 SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
2' See SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 92,855, at 90,192 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
22 SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REi'. (CCH)
93,785, at 93,412 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). An attorney might be permanently disqualified from
practicing before the SEC as a result of an injunction. See SEC 1933 Act Rev. Nos. 5088
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the injunctive action. Because of these competing policies, legal commen-
tators are also divided on this issue. 24 During the past year courts contin-
ued to disagree over whether negligence or scienter need be proven in an
SEC injunctive action.
In SEC v. Blatt, 2 the Fifth Circuit weighed the competing considera-
tions before deciding that the SEC must prove scienter in an injunctive
suit.2 2 8 The court noted that past decisions often considered public policy
arguments, such as the SEC's public guardian function and the mild reme-
dies obtained by the SEC, as a way to differentiate between private action
and SEC enforcement suits.2 2 The court concluded, however, that even
though policy arguments were appealing, "the language of the statute
must control when sufficiently clear in its context. '"2 Moreover, the court
found that the scienter requirement applied with more force to an SEC
action than to a private damages suit because Congress did not contem-
plate private actions when section 10(b) was enacted. 29 Thus the Blatt
court concluded that since Rule 10b-5 injunctive actions and private dam-
age suits are "creatures of the same statute",20 the necessity of proving
culpability must be the same.2'
The federal district court for the District of Columbia recently took a
similar approach in SEC v. Wills. 2 Wills and his co-defendant were execu-
(1970) and 5147 (1977); SEC Rule of Practice, 2(e); 1978-1979 Securities Law Developments:
Supreme Court Definition of the Parameter of Class Actions in Shareholder Litigation, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 884 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Shareholder Litigation].
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
Compare Scienter Requirement, supra note 166, at 445 (scienter not required in SEC
injunctive actions) and Note, SEC Injunctive Actions: A Negligence Standard under Rule
lOb-5, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 763, 785 (1977) (scienter not required); with Berner & Franklin,
supra note 170, at 797-98 (SEC must prove scienter); and Lowenfels, supra note 170, at 807-
09 (scienter necessary).
In an injunctive action, a plaintiff normally must show an irreparable harm and an
inadequate remedy at law. DOBBS, supra note 181, at 57. The SEC need show neither. See
Rondeau v. Masinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975); K. BIALKIN, THE 10B SERIES OF
RULES, at 205-06 (1975). Since the SEC is specifically empowered to seek injunctions, it need
only meet the requirements of the statute. See note 215 supra.
583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); see note 212 supra.
6 583 F.2d at 1332-33. After noting that the scienter issue was left unresolved by the
Court in Hochfelder, the Blatt court briefly reviewed the Hochfelder reasoning for requiring
scienter in a private damages action. Id. The court was persuaded by the Hochfelder Court's
focus on the statutory language, and the legislative and administrative history of § 10b. The
Blatt court somewhat discounted the Hochfelder discussion of the interrelationship of the
civil liability provisions in the '33 and '34 Acts. Id. at 1333. See 425 U.S. at 206-09.
' 583 F.2d at 1333.
r' Id. The court labeled policy considerations as "extraneous". Id.
Id. at 1333 n.21. The Fifth Circuit stated "[t]he Supreme Court has determined that
Congress did not contemplate private actions under § 10(b). Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196
. . .Therefore, it follows logically that the scienter requirement implicit in the statute must
have been intended for SEC proceedings." Id. See text accompanying notes 254-57 infra.
583 F.2d at 1333.
231 Id.
Z22 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 1978).
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tive officers23 in a three company land development corporate structure.2
While the defendants were in office, these companies issued $100 million
of senior debentures. 5 During the time these debentures were outstanding,
the defendants' companies filed several forms with the SEC, including
form 10-K covering the calender year 1974, several quarterly 10-Q's, and
an Exchange Offer Prospectus and Solicitation Statement. 6 The SEC
maintained that each of these documents contained material misrepresen-
tations and omissions 2 7 as to the changing nature of the companies' busi-
ness and financial position.5 in violation of the securities laws. 9 The SEC
sought both an injunction and disgorgement of compensation paid the
defendants during the time of the misrepresentation,
240
After considering the facts, the Wills court reviewed the relevant argu-
ments regarding scienter in a Rule 10b-5 injunctive action. The court noted
that an injunctive action, unlike the private damage action in Hochfelder,
could not expand the defendants' potential liability to private plaintiffs
through use of a negligence standard.2 4' The court also observed that there
were different policy considerations underlying SEC actions and private
damage actions, 24 2 and that an approach that concentrated on the impact
of the defendant's action on the investing public, rather than consideration
2 Id. at 94,758.
"I Id. at 94,757-58.
Id. at 94,758.
" Id.; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308a; 243.310 (1978).
- [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712, at 94,758.
21 Id. at 94,761.
I The SEC alleged violations of §§ 5(b)(1) and 17(a) of the '33 Act and §§ 10(b), 13(a)
and 14(a) & (e) of the '34 Act and Rules 13a-1, 13a-11, 13a-13, 14a-9 and 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712, at 94,757.
The Wills court found that negligent conduct could violate §§ 13(a) and 14(a) & (e) of
the '34 Act and §§ 5(b) (i) and 17(a) (3) of the '33 Act, and that the defendants had negli-
gently made material omissions which violated these sections. Id. at 94,768-74. For a further
discussion of § 17(a), see text accompanying notes 301-33 infra.
240 Id. at 94,771.
2" Id. at 94,769. Since negligent action is easier to prove than action performed with
scienter, the Hochfelder Court felt that the number of plaintiffs bringing suits would be
greatly increased if a negligence standard was adopted. 425 U.S. at 214 n.33. The use of a
negligence standard in an SEC action would not affect a private damages action because a
private plaintiff still must prove scienter to recover. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec. Inc.,
574 F.2d 90, 96-97 n.4. A finding of scienter in an SEC action probably would have collateral
estoppel effect in a private damages action. See generally Shareholder Litigation, supra note
222.
211 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712, at 94,769. A private damage action seeks
to redress individual wrongs and reasonably allocate losses incurred by particular investors.
The SEC seeks to protect the public at large while providing a remedial function. Id. at
94,769. A broad standard of culpability would further the policies of the securities laws while
not inflicting unreasonable harm. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 200-01 (1963); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The SEC injunction is and should be a flexible
and effective enforcement tool. See 3 Loss, supra note 201, at 1981; Scienter Requirement,
supra note 166, at 440.
1979]
934 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
of the defendant's state of mind, might be proper. 4 However, the court
determined that three of the four factors found determinative in
Hochfelder - the language of section 10(b), the section's legislative history
and the administrative history2 4 - were equally persuasive in a suit for
an injunction.5 4 The court found further that since the language of section
10(b) applies equally to the SEC and a private plaintiff, and since the
legislative history of section 10(b) did not focus on private damage actions,
the section should be interpreted the same for each type of action.2 4 On
the basis of this reasoning, the Wills court held that scienter is an essential
element of an SEC injunctive action under section 10(b).
The only substantial difference in analysis between Wills and Blatt24
is the Wills court's consideration of public policy.2 1 The Supreme Court
in Hochfelder found no reason to examine the pqlicy considerations that
underlie section 10(b), finding the language of that section dispositive. '
The Hochfelder Court found that the language of section 10(b)
"specifically"25' included action undertaken with scienter and that appeal-
ing policy considerations could not change the wording of the statute
2
Even though Hochfelder interpreted section 10(b) only in the context of a
private damages action,5 3 when section 10(b) was written there was no
contemplation of a private right of action.254 Since Congress did not con-
"' [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712, at 94,769 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200-01 (1963)). By focusing on the result rather than
the degree of scienter, negligence is easily prescribed.
"1 425 U.S. at 201-12.
245 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712, at 94,769.
246 Id.
24? Id. After adopting the recklessness test set forth in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), the court decided that neither of the defendants had acted
recklessly in connection with the non disclosures and mistatements made in the Exchange
Offer Prospectus and Solicitation Statement, and denied injunctive relief. [Current] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712, at 94,774.
The District of Columbia had foreshadowed the reasoning eventually employed in Wills
four months earlier in SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
In NSMC the court stated that the "analysis of the language of the statutory provision
strongly suggests that proof of scienter is required in all actions under § 10(b), regardless of
the identity of the parties involved". Id. at 710. The court expressly refused to rule on the
issue, however, finding that all defendants in NSMC acted with scienter. Id.
241 See text accompanying notes 225-31 supra.
214 See note 241 supra.
- The Hochfelder Court rested its decision on four basic grounds. The Court concluded
that the language of § 10(b) clearly connoted intentional conduct, 425 U.S. at 201, that the
legislative history of the '34 Act demonstrated that scienter was required by § 10(b), id. at
201, 206, that comparison with other sections of the securities statutes demonstrated proce-
dural restrictions not present in § 10(b), id. at 208-09, and that the administrative history of
Rule 10b-5 showed that it was restricted to activities involving scienter. Id. at 212.
' Id. at 214.
22 Id. at 214 n.33.
Id. at 193-94 n.12.
See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1934); SEC Rel. No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
See also SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 n.21 (5th Cir. 1978).
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template a private right of action under section 10(b),2 5 Congress must
have intended that scienter be required in SEC injunctions, as the injunc-
tion was the only action available at the time.25 Therefore, if consideration
of public policy is inappropriate when interpreting section 10(b) in the
context of a private damages action,27 such consideration is equally inap-
propriate for SEC actions.
In contrast to the courts in Blatt and Wills, the Second Circuit in SEC
v. Aaron26 held that the SEC need not prove scienter in injunctive actions
based on Rule 10b-5 or section 17(a) of the '33 Act.25 In Aaron, the defen-
dant supervised the sales and training activities of registered representa-
tives of an SEC registered broker-dealer.2 0 Two employees of the broker-
dealer who were supervised by the defendant 2 ' made false and misleading
statements to prospective purchasers of stock.21 2 The defendant was noti-
fied twice that his sales representatives were making misleading state-
ments, 23 yet did nothing to stop their actions.2 64 The district court found
that the defendant knew the statements made by the other employees were
false and misleading because of the information he possessed and that he
had a duty to stop the misrepresentations.2 6 5 The Second Circuit concluded
that the lower court's finding that the defendant acted with scienter was
unnecessary 60 and affirmed the grant of final injunctive relief.6 7
425 U.S. at 196.
258 But see Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 181
(1933) (arguing that section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applies to innocent conduct); text accompa-
nying notes 258-92 infra.
z1 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
21 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,800 (2d Cir. March 12, 1979).
2, Id. at 95,128. The SEC's complaint also alleged a violation of § 5 of the '33 Act. 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
21 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043, at 91,684 (S.D.N.Y.
May 5, 1977). The defendant, an employee for 15 years, was coordinator of several depart-
ments of his father's firm, E. L. Aaron & Co., and managed the firm's sales force. The
defendant also maintained important information files about all of the securities his company
actively traded. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800 at 95,124.
2 Id. The two registered representatives who made the misleading statements operated
from Aaron & Co.'s Roslyn Heights, New York office. The defendant regularly worked in the
downtown New York office. Id.
282 Id. The two sales representatives were attempting to sell Lawn-A-Mat Chemical &
Equipment Corp. (LAM) stock by representing that LAM was building a new small car and
a tractor and was in solid financial position. Id.
21 Id. Several of the people solicited by the salesmen were already stockholders of LAM
and knew of the recent financial losses, and the lack of new product development. Several of
these people informed LAM officers of the statements of the sales representatives. LAM
officers warned both salesmen of their misleading statements before contacting the defen-
dant. Id.
284 Id.
25 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043, at 91,686 (S.D.N.Y.
May 5, 1977); see note 260 supra.
25 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800, at 95,128 n.8.
217 Id. at 95,124.
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In Aaron, the Second Circuit noted that the "compelling" 68 distinc-
tions between injunctive and private damage actions dictated the necessity
of employing a negligence standard in injunctive actions. The court identi-
fied four of these distinctions in reaching its decision. First, the court felt
that the pre-Hochfelder precedent of the Second Circuit, which held that
the SEC need not show scienter in an injunctive action, 69 had not been
altered by Hochfelder. These pre-Hochfelder decisions focused on the
SEC's public protection function rather than the private action's redress
of past wrongs by awarding monetary relief.270 Second, the Aaron court
examined the statutory language of section 10(b) and concluded that the
language of section 10(b) was unclear and subject to an interpretation
which differed from the Supreme Court in Hochfelder ' and the Fifth
Circuit in SEC v. Blatt.27 2 By finding that the wording of the statute was
unclear, the court felt that a review of legislative history was appropriate .
3
Third, the Aaron court seized on language from Hochfelder that the legisla-
tive history of section 10(b) offered no guidance in determining congres-
sional intent. 4 Thus, in an attempt to determine congressional intent, the
Aaron court examined the legislative history of section 17(a) of the '33 Act
and the statutory provision authorizing SEC injunctive actions, section
21(d) of the '34 Act.2
5
The court concluded that the legislative history of section 17(a) demon-
strated that Congress rejected a scienter requirement for the enforcement
of section 17(a).26 The court decided that this same pattern of culpability
Id. at 95,129.
Id.; see, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809 2d Cir. 1975);
SEC v. Manor Nursing Center, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972). The Aaron court
attributed significance to the fact that the Second Circuit had correctly interpreted § 10(b)
when employed in private damage actions, before the Hochfelder decision, uniformly holding
that scienter was required. E.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir.
1973) (en banc); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).
21 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800, at 95,130. The Aaron court cited a
Second Circuit opinion of a few months earlier, SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (2d
Cir. 1978), see text accompanying notes 307-18 infra, which compared the goals of an enforce-
ment action with a private damage action. See note 242 supra.
"1 425 U.S. at 214.
272 583 F.2d at 1333; see text accompanying note 228 supra.
1 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800, at 95,130.
2 Id. The Aaron court seems to have interpreted the phrase, "bereft of any explicit
explanation of Congress' intent," 425 U.S. at 201, to mean that the legislative history of §
10(b) offered no explanation of congressional intent, so that the history was not in conflict
with a scienter standard. This interpretation is strained. The Hochfelder Court was referring
to the legislative history of the entire '34 Act, not only § 10(b). 425 U.S. 201-07. Therefore,
the use of the word "explicit" should be interpreted to mean clear-cut or unambiguous.
Further, the Aaron court seems to ignore the Hochfelder statement that the relevant portions
of the legislative history of the '34 Act supported the scienter standard. Id.
717 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 96,800, at 94,130-31.
" Id. at 94,131-32. The court used the same reasoning and quoted the same legislative
history of § 17(a) as did the Coven court. See text accompanying notes 317-19 infra.
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had been incorporated into the '34 Act .27 The Aaron court also reviewed
the legislative history of section 21(d),2 8 and concluded that the SEC was
not required to prove scienter. The court quoted language from the report
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,271 which
was reviewing the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. The report stated
that, "in particular, issues related to matters of damages, such as scienter,
causation and the extent of damages, are elements not required to be
demonstrated in a Commission injunctive action. ' 280 The Aaron court felt
that there could be no clearer indication of congressional intent to exempt
SEC injunctive actions from the private action scienter requirement.28
Finally, the fourth distinction offered by the court for rejecting a scien-
ter standard in SEC injunctive actions was that while Hochfelder was
concerned that a negligence standard would broaden the class of Rule 10b-
5 plaintiffs and nullify express civil remedies, a negligence standard would
more easily fit into the overall enforcement scheme of the securities laws.
22
A negligence standard would not abrogate any other provisions of the
federal securities laws, and would end the disunity among the similar
provisions of the '33 Act.3
2 See Section 210 of Title II of the 1934 Act, ch. 404, § 210, 48 Stat. 881 (1934). The
court's conclusion that the '34 Act incorporated the culpability requirements 'Of the '33 Act
is doubtful. Section 210 merely transferred to the SEC the Federal Trade Commission's
"powers, duties, and functions". Id. Section 210 further states that "[a]ll rights and interests
accruing or to accrue under the Securities Act of 1933 . . .may be exercised and enforced".
Id. Section 210 makes no mention of the pattern of culpability of the '33 Act or the incorpora-
tion of that pattern into the '34 Act.
21 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800, at 95,130.
The Aaron court's reliance on section 21 of the '34 Act appear's to be misplaced. Section
21(d) provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about
to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chap-
ter, the rules or regulations thereunder. . .it may in its discretion bring an ac-
tion. . .to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent
or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). As is obvious from the wording of the statute, the Commission
must still prove a violation of the '34 Act. If the SEC is utilizing § 10(b) and § 10(b) may
only be violated by conduct undertaken with scienter, see note 293 infra, the SEC may only
obtain an injunction upon proof of scienter.
21 S. REP. No. 75, 94 Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975).
nO Id. (emphasis in original).
281 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800, at 95,131. The Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs report, S. REP. No. 75, 94 Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975),
dealt with an amendment to § 21 which added a new subsection that "exempt[ed] actions
brought by the Commission under the federal securities laws from consolidation or coordina-
tion with other actions not brought by the Commission unless such consolidation is consented
to by the Commission". Id. at 73. The amendment was not concerned with the question of
scienter in SEC actions, cannot be read to deal with the question of scienter, and has no
bearing'on the actual legislative history of § 10(b).
282 [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,800, at 95,131. A negligence standard would
allow the SEC to more effectively enforce the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 336-37 infra.
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In the past year a federal district court of Arizona in SEC v. Western
Geothermal & Power Corp.,"4 also held that proof of scienter is unneces-
sary in SEC actions based on Rule 10b-5 or section 17(a) of the '33 Act.
The scienter issue was before the court on a motion to dismiss,26 and even
though only the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were pre-
sented, the court's basis of decision is apparent. The court in Western
Geothermal noted that the SEC enforces the federal securities laws in
order to protect the public, not to punish a state of mind.28 7 The court also
found that the investing public is injured by negligent violations as much
as willful ones and that the Hochfelder standard of scienter does not
apply.288 Therefore, the court reasoned that scienter need not be alleged or
proven in SEC injunctive actions .2  The court's reasons for determining
that negligent conduct supports a Rule 10b-5 injunctive action are based
on the SEC's role as protector of the investing public. 20 However, decisions
interpreting Rule 10b-5 in light of public policy rather than relying on the
language of section 10(b), 2 ' are questionable in light of Hochelder.2 2
Whether the SEC need prove scienter in an injunctive action brought
under Rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) remains an open question. 23 The Aaron
court apparently misinterpreted both the language of Hochfelder 2 1 and
section 210 of Title II of the '34 Act.295 The court also incorrectly focused
28, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,590 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 1978).
2 Id. at 94,524. The SEC, in addition to its section 10(b) claim, sought injunctions under
§ 12 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976), for the sale of unregistered securities and under §
9(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1976), for stock manipulation. [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,590, at 94,523.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 94,524.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.; see text accompanying notes 287-88 supra.
291 See text accompanying notes 250-57 supra.
"2 See text accompanying notes 248-57 supra.
293 The most compelling reason to require scienter in SEC actions brought under § 10b
is that the Supreme Court has interpreted the actual language of the section. The language
is the same for the Commission as it is for a private plaintiff. Rather than focus on who the
plaintiff happens to be, the proper focus should be on the defendant. If the defendant violates
the statute only when he acts with scienter, 425 U.S. at 193, 214, then the prescribed conduct
has been defined. The identity of the plaintiff should make no difference. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In other areas of the law, the remedy granted often depends on the defendant's state of
mind. To obtain damages based on fraud, for example, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted with scienter. See DOBBS, supra note 181, at 608. To get recission of a
contract, however, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant made a negligent misre-
presentation, DoBBs, supra note 181, at 609; PROSSER, supra note 169, at 709, and in some
instances, an innocent misrepresentation would suffice. See PROSSER, supra note 169, at 709.
This focus on relief has not been applied in the federal securities laws. Although a private
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate an inadequate remedy at law and irrepar-
able harm, the SEC has not been required to make a similar showing. See note 224 supra.
2M4 See note 274 supra.
211 See note 277 supra.
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on section 21(d) rather than section 10(b), 216 and relied on a questionable
interpretation of legislative history.27 The correct decisions were in Blatt
and Wills, stressing the language, administrative and legislative history of
section 10(b) rather than exploring policy differences between private
damage and injunctive actions. Both decisions conform with the
Hochfelder holding and the spirit of the Supreme Court's recent trend of
contracting the scope of protection provided private plaintiffs under the
federal securities laws. 28 Yet the Supreme Court seemingly has failed to
recognize that, unlike private plaintiffs, the SEC needs flexibility to en-
force more effectively the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. A
negligence standard for Rule 10b-5 injunctive actions would be neither
unfair for defendants nor restrict the flow of securities transactions. Absent
a Supreme Court decision to the contrary, however, Congress must amend
section 10(b) so that the SEC may enjoin purely negligent conduct 211 if the
securities laws are to be interpreted by the lower courts in a remedial
manner.
Congressional enactment of the American Law Institute's Proposed
Federal Securities Code"0 (Code) would be an alternative to amending
section 10(b). The antifraud provisions of the Code eliminate the scienter
requirement in an injunctive action by prohibiting any fraudulent act or
misrepresentation. 11 A misrepresentation is defined as "an untrue state-
ment of a material fact, or. . .an omission to state a material fact neces-
sary to prevent the statements made from being misleading in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made."3 ' Since a misrepresen-
tation may be made without scienter,11 the Commission would not need
2,1 See note 278 supra.
297 See note 28i supra.
299 See 1977-78 Developments, supra note 262, at 799 n.1. In the last four years, seven
major decisions have seriously curtailed private rights of action under the federal securities
laws. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738-39 (1975) (private
plaintiff in Rule 10b-5 case must be a purchaser or seller of a security); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (private plaintiff must prove scienter to recover damages
under rule 10b-5); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.24 (1975)
(definition of a security restricted); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977)
(tender offeror suing as a take-over bidder had no right to sue for damages under § 14(e) of
the '34 Act); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (restricting the
meaning of materiality under § 14(a) of the '34 Act); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 477 (1977) (Rule 10b-5 does not reach breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a
short-form corporate merger); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S. Ct. 790, 796
(1979) (further restriction of a definition of a security).
" The SEC is powerless to effect any change since the scope of liability under Rule 10b-
5 is limited by the language of § 10(b). Rule 10b-5 cannot be directed toward negligent
conduct until § 10(b) is amended. See note 310 infra.
200 ALI FEDERAL SEcuarrms CODE (Proposed Official Draft)(1978).
10 Id. § 1602(a).
m Id. § 297(a). Section 1819(a) allows the commission to bring an injunctive action to
enjoin any violation of the Code.
2 A person acts with scienter under the Code "if he knows he is making a misrepresen-
tation. . .or acts in reckless disregard of whether that is so". § 299.50.
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to prove scienter to get an injunction under the Code."0 4
The relationship between section 17(a) of the '33 Act °0 and Rule 10b-5
has become an increasingly important issue within the past year. Although
the language of Rule 10b-5 is virtually identical to section 17(a),10 1 section
17(a) applies only to the "offer or sale"3 7 of securities, while Rule 10b-5
applies to the "purchase or sale"3 8 of a security. Since the word
"purchase" is absent from section 17(a), the section cannot be used to
remedy misrepresentations or omissions by a purchaser of a security'. How-
ever, the vast majority of transactions challenged under Rule 10b-5 are
covered by section 17(a) as well. Since Hochfelder, the critical question has
been whether scienter must be shown in an SEC injunctive action brought
under section 17(a).111 The courts addressing this issue in the past year
have held that scienter is not a necessary element of an SEC injunction
action under section 17(a) °. 3 1
o See § 1819(a); § 287, note (8)(e). The Code's counterpart of civil liability under Rule
10b-5 is found in § 1703(a). When a defendant violates § 1602(a), see text accompanying note
301 supra, he also violates § 1703(a). Since a violation of § 1602(a) is not premised on a
showing of scienter, no showing of scienter is necessary to establish civil liability. Subsection
(f) of 1703 provides the defendant with a good faith defense if he can show "he reasonably
did not believe that there was a misrepresentation. . . ." § 1703(f). See generally D. Ruder
& A. Sommers, Meeting of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, 26-29 (Chi-
cago, Ill., Oct. 13-14, 1978); D. Ruder, Transcript of Procedings of Panel Discussion Presented
by The Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, 79-97 (Williamsburg, Va., April 8, 1978).
15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1976); see note 34 supra.
Although the language of § 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 are virtually identical, the language
of 99 10(b) and 17(a) differ significantly.
o 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1976).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
309 Five circuit courts have expressly or impliedly recognized that a private right of action
exists under § 17(a). See Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1244-45
(7th Cir. 1977); Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1277, 1280 n.2. (2d Cir. 1973); Kellman v. ICS, Inc., 447 F.2d 1305, 1308 (6th Cir. 1971);
Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court
twice has refused to decide the issue. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 99 S.
Ct. 790, 795 n.9 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 n.6
(1975). The Eighth Circuit has held that § 17(a) does not confer a private cause of action for
damages on a purchaser of a security. Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152,
155, 159 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). The question whether scienter is
required in a private action is undecided, even though the only three cases that have dealt
with culpability in private actions under section 17(a) have held scienter necessary. Sanders
v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977); Valles Salgado v. Piedmont Capital
Corp., 452 F. Supp. 853, 858 n.8 (D.P.R. 1978); Malik v. Universal Resources Corp., 425 F.
Supp. 350, 363 (S.D. Cal. 1976). See generally Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule
10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. Rxv. 641
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Hazen].
310 SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1007 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Coven,
581 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1978).
The Supreme Court's basis for decision in Hochfelder engendered the dispute over the
interpretation of the language of Rule 10b-5 and § 17(a). Hochfelder did not hold that the
language of Rule 10b-5 required proof of scienter. 425 U.S. at 213-14. The Court held specifi-
cally that the words "device", "manipulative", and "contrivance" used in § 10(b) were not
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The Second Circuit recently held in SEC v. Coven"' that negligent
,conduct could form the basis of injunctive relief under section 17(a). 2 The
defendant was an attorney acting as special counsel for a corporation for
the purpose of implementing a public offering of the company's securi-
ties. 3 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the
defendant had aided and abetted a section 17(a) violation regarding the
fraudulent closing of an escrow account in connection with the public
offering. 3 4 The Coven court based its decision that negligence violates
section 17(a) on three broad reasons. First, the court examined the lan-
guage of section 17(a) and found that since the words "manipulation or
deceptive device or contrivance" 31 5 were not present, the scienter element
drawn by the Hochfelder court from the language of section 10(b) did not
apply to section 17(a).11 Second, the court looked at the legislative history
of section 17(a).311 The Senate's version of section 17 contained the words
"with the intent to defraud" whereas the House version did not '.3 1 The
Conference Committee adopted the House version, implicitly rejecting the
requirement of an intent to defraud."' Finally, the court found that the
aimed at negligent conduct. The Court decided that these words "connote intentional or
willful conduct designed to defraud investors by controlling or artifically affecting the price
of securities". 425 U.S. at 199. Therefore, if § 10(b) was aimed only at conduct embracing
scienter, the SEC could not promulgate a rule requiring a standard of proof less than scienter.
See 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 163, at 915 n.201. This reasoning, however, impliedly
recognizes that the language of Rule 10b-5 was designed to apply to negligence. Thus § 17(a),
encompassing virtually the same language of Rule 10b-5, must also apply to negligence. See
Hazen, supra note 309, at 673.
3" 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978).
322 Id. at 1027-30.
3,3 Id. at 1021. The defendant was in complete control of the public offering. His services
included offering legal opinions regarding the proposed issue, finding underwriters, and draft-
ing documents concerning the 6,000,000 shares to be offered at $.10 per share. Id.
3" Id. The escrow account was set up so that if 3,000,000 of the shares were not sold
within 60 days, and if the escrow account did not contain $300,000, all monies would be
returned to the purchasers of the stock. Id. at 1022. The district court found, and the Second
Circuit agreed, that the account never contained $300,000. Id. The defendant incurred § 17(a)
liability when he either negligently or recklessly wrote a letter to the bank holding the escrow
account, certifying that 3,075,000 of the shares were sold. Id. at 1023, 1029.
3, Id. at 1026-27.
3 The Supreme Court specifically relied on the term "manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance" in Hochfelder when intepreting § 10b of the '34 Act. 425 U.S. at 197. The
Second Circuit concluded that all three subsections of § 17(a) were aimed at negligent con-
duct. 581 F.2d at 1026. Although some courts have interpreted the language of subsections
(1) and (3) to be aimed at intentional conduct because they use the words 'defraud" and
"fraud", see Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977); 3 Loss,
supra note 39, at 1441-42, the Coven court read the section as a whole and concluded that
the section "was intended to expand common law notions of the elements of fraud". 581 F.2d
at 1026 n.11.
311 Id. at 1027.
"' Id.
3" Id. The description of the scope of injunctive enforcement under the '33 Act resembles
the language of § 17(a). H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933).
The court also thought that statements by legal commentators expressing the opinion
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public policy of protecting the investing public through equitable reme-
dies 320 could be served only by allowing the SEC to obtain injunctive relief
upon a showing of negligent conduct. 32' After finding that the negligent
conduct was likely to continue, the court affirmed the lower court's grant
of injunctive relief.
2
In a case that reversed the only decision squarely holding that section
17(a) requires intent,3  the Fourth Circuit held in SEC v. American Realty
Trust3 4 that the SEC is not required to prove scienter in an injunctive
action based on section 17(a). 315 In American Realty, Thomas Broyhill,
president of American Realty Trust caused three material omissions to be
made in a March 1974 prospectus issued in connection with the offering of
debentures.2 6 In reaching its decision, the circuit court rejected the conten-
tion that since the language of Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a) were virtually
identical, then, as a result of the reasoning in Hochfelder, section 17(a)
must require intent.3 7 The court correctly noted that unlike Rule 10b-5,
section 17(a) was a congressional enactment, thus not subject to the SEC's
rule making limitations.32 8 Therefore, the court stated that the importation
of the "manipulative device" language of section 10(b) into Rule 10b-5, has
no bearing upon a proper interpretation of section 17a(2). 311 Since section
that § 17(a) was aimed at negligent conduct were important. The court relied on a statement
by the soon-to-be Justice Douglas that "even innocent acts to obtain money or property by
means of untrue statements of material facts or omissions to state material facts were unlaw-
ful." Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 181 (1933). See
also James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 Micm. L. REv. 624, 656 (1934).
320 Since the Hochfelder decision dealt only with § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, consideration
of the public policy underlying § 17(a) is not foreclosed.
21 581 F.2d at 1027-28. The court emphasized that an SEC enforcement action protects
the investing public and does not seek to punish a particular defendant. Id.
32 Id. at 1031. Adopting the recklessness standard outlined in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d at 44-47, see text accompanying notes 172-90 supra, the court also
found that Coven had been reckless and had probably violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 581
F.2d at 1029.
3 SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1971).
324 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 1007.
132 Id. at 1003. The SEC also alleged material omissions in two forms 10K and a proxy
statement, but the court did not pass on these allegations. Id. at 1002. The material omissions
in the prospectus concerned the defendant's decision to guarantee a loan from a New York
bank to a partnership associated with the defendant, to loan this partnership $368,000 which
the partnership could then loan to a Virginia corporation so that the corporation could pay
overdue rent of $368,000 back to the defendant, and also to loan a couple $1.2 million to
develop a tract of land into a subdivision. Id. at 1003-04. A close examination of these
transactions revealed that the partnership was composed of a relative and friend of the
defendant's president, the sons and daughters of three trustees of the defendant owned
49.44% of the Virginia corporation, and the couple were joint venturers in the subdivision
project with the daughter and son-in-law of the defendant's president. Id. at 1004.
12 Id. at 1005-06; see note 310 supra.
312 586 F.2d at 1006. Hochfelder held that the SEC did not have rulemaking power to
promulgate a rule not requiring scienter since § 10(b) required scienter. 425 U.S. at 213-14;
see 1976-1977 Developments, supra note 163, at 909-10 n.174.
329 586 F.2d at 1006.
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17(a) does not contain language equivalent to "fraud" or "willfulness",
Congress apparently intended to proscribe negligent conduct as well as
intentional conduct.330 The American Realty court also agreed with the
Second Circuit's analysis of the legislative history in Coven, which inter-
preted the congressional rejection of the Senate's version of section 17(a)
requiring the intent to defraud,"' as the repudiation of a scienter require-
ment. The American Realty court concluded that the proof of serious negli-
gent conduct warranted the granting of an injunction against future viola-
tions.33
The Second Circuit in SEC v. Coven333 and the Fourth Circuit in SEC
v. American Realty Trust334 used virtually the same reasoning employed
by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder' s to find that the SEC is not required
to prove scienter in an injunctive action brought under section 17(a). Both
courts found the wording of the statute, the legislative history, and policy
arguments dispositive.
Because of the wording of the statute,33" the SEC cannot use section
17(a) to enjoin fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions by a purchaser,
as opposed to a seller, of a security. An anomalous situation now exists
in which the SEC is able to use section 17(a) to enjoin negligent conduct
on the part of sellers that operates to defraud buyers, yet is powerless to
stop negligent conduct on the part of buyers that operates to defraud
sellers. This logical inconsistency is more a matter of semantics than of
substance. Rule 10b-5 applies to both buyers and sellers of securities, yet
requires proof of scienter to support a violation, while section 17(a) applies
" Id. at 1006. The American Realty court focused its analysis on § 17(a)(2). Id. Even
though the court stated that the language of the entire section does not suggest that Congress
meant to reach only intentional conduct rather than negligence, § 17(a)(2) is bracketed
between (1) and (3) that specifically refer to fraud. Id. The court refused to hold that subsec-
tions (1) and (3) did not require scienter, and suggested in a footnote that they might be
aimed at intentional conduct only. Id. at 1006 n.5. But see note 316 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 317-19 supra.
= 586 F.2d at 1007. In SEC v. Wills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712, at
94,770 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1978), see text accompanying notes 232-47 supra, the district court
for the District of Columbia followed the Coven and American Realty reasoning, holding that
scienter is not required in an SEC injunctive action under § 17(a). See also SEC v. Western
Goethermal & Power Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,590 (Sept.
16, 1978) (scienter not required under § 17(a)). But see Greenfield v. Cheek, [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,560 (Ariz. App., Sept. 19, 1978) (scienter required in •
damage action brought under § 17(a)). Accord Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790,
794-95 (7th Cir. 1977).
3 571 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); see text accompanying notes 311-12 supra.
-4 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); see text accompanying notes 323-32 supra.
3 The Hochfelder decision was based on analysis of the actual words of § 10(b), the
legislative and administrative history, and the section's relation to the other securities laws.
425 I.S. at 200, 201, 201-07, 212; see note 250 supra. Coven and American Realty rely on the
language of the statute, legislative and administrative history and policy reasons to rule on §
17(a). See text accompanying notes 311-33 supra.
s' See note 305 supra.
See text accompanying notes 307-09 supra.
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